Deprivative Recognition by Aloni, Erez
The Peter A. Allard School of Law
Allard Research Commons




Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, aloni@allard.ubc.ca
Follow this and additional works at: http://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Allard Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard Research Commons.
Citation Details





Family law is now replete with proposals advocating for the legal recognition of 
nonmarital relationships: those between friends, relatives, unmarried intimate partners, 
and the like.  The presumption underlying these proposals is that legal recognition is 
financially beneficial to partners.  This assumption is sometimes wrong: Legal recognition 
of relationships can be harmful to unmarried partners—a reality whose impact on policy 
concerning regulation of nonmarital unions has not been explored.  As this Article 
shows, a significant number of people benefit financially from nonrecognition of their 
relationships.  While in most cases the state turns a blind eye to this financial gain, when 
it comes to a particular set of benefits, the state routinely recognizes partners against 
their will in order to withhold or terminate benefits, a subset of ascriptive recognition 
that I call “deprivative recognition.”
Deprivative recognition is unjust because it is asymmetrical: It deprives couples of benefits 
they would receive if they were unpartnered while they nevertheless remain ineligible 
to receive benefits granted to married couples in similar arenas.  This asymmetry is 
particularly troublesome because those who enjoy the benefits of nonrecognition often 
belong to particularly vulnerable populations, such as those who qualify for means-
tested programs.  This Article recognizes and provides a normative assessment of 
deprivative recognition and the distributive injustices it creates.
Identifying deprivative recognition, in turn, unearths a larger set of theoretical questions 
about the interplay between cultural recognition and distributive justice in the law of 
unmarried partners, including a question about what kind of law promotes both cultural 
recognition and distributive justice for unmarried partners.  The Article builds on 
Nancy Fraser’s theory of recognition and redistribution as a “folk paradigm of justice,” 
explaining why it is essential for the law of unmarried partners to adopt both of these 
aspects of justice and how this can be done.
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INTRODUCTION 
Following extensive efforts by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
(LGBT) organizations,1 the Department of Education recently announced 
that eligibility for financial aid for children who live with unmarried or same-sex 
parents will be determined based on both parents’ incomes.2  Before this new rule, 
children of unmarried or same-sex parents could include only one parent on 
their financial aid application, a matter that caused some of these children to 
feel as though their parents’ unions were second class.3  Even Justice Kennedy, 
writing for the majority in United States v. Windsor,4 referred to the old finan-
cial aid rule as a case in which same-sex couples would be “honored” to take 
on obligations toward each other if given the opportunity.5  The media, 
LGBT organizations, and those who support the recognition of complex family 
forms have seen this policy change as a political victory.6 
But, on second thought, this form of legal recognition will result in reduction 
or elimination of financial aid for the majority of applicants who have unmarried or 
same-sex parents.7  Moreover, legally recognizing these parents as partners 
primarily to increase their participation in paying for their children’s educa-
  
1. See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, FAFSA Changes to Recognize Same-Sex Parents by 2014, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/30/fafsa-changes-
same-sex-parents-2014_n_3185755.html (“‘GLSEN has long worked to ensure that sexual 
orientation and gender identity are not used to discriminate against students in our nation’s 
K-12 schools, whether that student identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender 
(LGBT), has LGBT friends, or comes from an LGBT family,’ said GLSEN Director of 
Public Policy Shawn Gaylord, per the Blade.”). 
2. Id. 
3. See infra Part I.A.2. 
4. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (holding section 3 of the Defense 
of Marriage Act unconstitutional). 
5. Id. (“DOMA divests married same-sex couples of the duties and responsibilities that are an 
essential part of married life and that they in most cases would be honored to accept were 
DOMA not in force.  For instance, because it is expected that spouses will support each other 
as they pursue educational opportunities, federal law takes into consideration a spouse’s 
income in calculating a student’s federal financial aid eligibility.  Same-sex married couples 
are exempt from this requirement.” (citation omitted)).  In fact, by the time Windsor was 
handed down, the financial aid policy had already changed—a matter that went unmentioned 
by Justice Kennedy.  Klein, supra note 1 (reporting on the change of calculating financial on 
April 30, 2013, almost two months before the Windsor decision was issued).    
6. Klein, supra note 1. 
7. See Troy Onink, Department Of Education “Comes Out” on College Aid for Children of Gay Parents, 
FORBES (May 6, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/troyonink/2013/05/06/department-of-
education-comes-out-on-college-aid-for-students-of-gay-parents (“[S]tudents with parents 
who are not married will now have to report both parent’s [sic] incomes, decreasing their aid 
eligibility substantially.”). 
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tion is an economic injustice.  This is so because although their parenthood is 
legally recognized, their relationship is not.  Lacking such recognition, these 
couples are excluded from hundreds of tangible economic benefits that are 
granted only to married couples.8  As noted by Justice Kennedy in Windsor, 
the financial loss that unmarried parent couples thus suffer from 
nonrecognition of their relationship has a direct financial effect on their 
parenthood.9  Furthermore, this new rule applies only to parents who live together; 
thus, in reality, it does not affect parents per se, but only cohabitating parents.  
The bottom line is that recognizing couples only for purposes of withholding 
a benefit from them while denying other related benefits and protections 
leads to economic maldistribution.10 
The new federal rule highlights one of the foundational misconceptions 
in legal scholarship surrounding domestic relationships: the dominant assumption 
that legal recognition of relationships is always economically beneficial to the 
recognized partners.11  More importantly, the rule illustrates the complicated 
and undertheorized interplay between distributive justice and cultural recog-
nition in the law governing unmarried partners:12  Cultural recognition can 
  
8. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 956–57 (Mass. 2003) (“[T]he 
fact remains that marital children reap a measure of family stability and economic security 
based on their parents’ legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily 
accessible, to nonmarital children.  Some of these benefits are social . . . . Others are material, 
such as the greater ease of access to family-based State and Federal benefits that attend the 
presumptions of one’s parentage.”). 
9. United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (U.S. June 26, 2013) (“DOMA also brings financial 
harm to children of same-sex couples.  It raises the cost of health care for families by taxing 
health benefits provided by employers to their workers’ same-sex spouses.  And it denies or 
reduces benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a spouse and parent, benefits that are an 
integral part of family security.” (citations omitted)). 
10. For an extended critique of the new financial aid rule, see Erez Aloni, Relationship Recognition 
Madness, HUFFINGTON POST (June 12, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/erez-aloni/relation 
ship-recognition-madness_b_3422346.html?utm_hp_ref=college&ir=College#es_share_ended. 
11. See, e.g., M. V. Lee Badgett, Variations on an Equitable Theme: Explaining International Same-
Sex Partner Recognition Laws, in SAME-SEX COUPLES, SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS & 
HOMOSEXUAL MARRIAGES: A FOCUS ON CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENTIALS 95, 99 
(Marie Digoix & Patrick Festy eds., 2004) (“Individual same-sex couples, especially those 
with property or children, would have the same economic incentives as different-sex couples 
to desire access to the legal framework created by marriage, in addition to any other 
customary benefits of being married.”). 
12. It is important to note that the term “recognition” can have two meanings that sometimes 
intersect.  “Legal recognition” is the action of the state, based on the type of relationship 
targeted, that has legal consequences for partners.  “Cultural recognition,” discussed further 
in Parts II and IV, is the acknowledgment of the differences of individuals or collective 
groups, without the demand that they assimilate to the dominant culture. 
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result in economic maldistribution, and as this Article subsequently explains, 
redistributive economic remedies can result in cultural misrecognition.13 
Indeed, the fundamental goals of the marriage equality movement have been 
to eliminate economic maldistribution and to foster cultural recognition of nontra-
ditional families.14  In recent decades, family law has also centered around such 
struggles by following a similar logic; it is now replete with suggestions that the 
state should recognize a variety of nonmarital relationships—friends, rela-
tives, unmarried conjugal couples, and nonmonogamous groupings15—as worthy 
of protection. 
Largely missing from the celebration of recognition in the law of domes-
tic relations is the simple yet meaningful fact that legal recognition comes 
with a financial cost—sometimes an unjust cost.16  It is difficult to overem-
phasize the importance of understanding this phenomenon in the project of 
theorizing the law of unmarried people.  To put it simply, attempting to address 
the law of unmarried partners without taking account of this issue is unsound.  
This is because there is a clear correlation between the demographic charac-
teristics of unmarried partners in the United States and the groups that gain 
fiscally from legal nonrecognition.  That is, the largest groups of cohabitants 
include poor and low-income individuals who are the beneficiaries of means-
  
13. Cultural recognition was one of the two main rationales behind the department’s new rule.  
LGBT organizations fought for this policy in order to repair a cultural misrecognition that 
the previous policy resulted in.  But for the Department of Education there were two 
rationales: one, reducing the cultural harm in misrecognizing unmarried parents; and two, 
better reflecting the financial situation of applicants and saving taxpayers money.  See Libby 
A. Nelson, Aid Applicants With 2 Mothers, INSIDEHIGHERED (Apr. 30, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/04/30/fafsa-changes-recognized-many-kinds-
parents. 
14. Cf. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS 224, 228–
33 (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) (explaining that marriage equality is 
being pursued for access to marriage’s tangible goods and status equality).  One may argue 
that cultural recognition has been the main mission of the marriage equality movement and 
maldistribution has been the form of tangible injury that recognition proponents have 
asserted.  Indeed this is evident from the strong resistance to civil unions, which solve almost 
all the financial problems that stem from the same-sex marriage ban but do not have the 
cultural weight that is attendant with marriage. 
15. See infra Part II.B (surveying the major proposals for legal recognition of nonmarital 
relationships). 
16. As I discuss in Part II.B, the assumption that some people are not interested in recognition of 
their relationships is sometimes discussed in family law scholarship.  See, e.g., Shahar Lifshitz, 
Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009).  But there the assumption is that people are not interested 
in recognition because they are unready for or uninterested in commitment to each other—
not because the state would recognize their union in order to withhold or terminate an 
existing benefit. See id. at 1576.  
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tested programs,17 the elderly and divorced who may lose existing entitlements 
upon remarriage,18 and college students who can be awarded more financial 
aid for higher education based on their (or their parents’) nonmarital status.19  
This Article undertakes to provide an account of the areas in which 
nonrecognition can be financially rewarding.  It then examines how the notion of 
gaining from nonrecognition has been overlooked by most legal scholarship in the 
area, and assesses how policies promoting legal recognition, if accepted, 
would affect the lives of those people currently in unrecognized relationships.20 
More puzzling than the dominant assumption that legal recognition is 
virtually always financially beneficial to the couple is the prevalence of the belief 
that legal recognition is always at least partially voluntary.  Proposals for legal 
recognition of nonmarital unions assume that only what this Article terms 
partially ascriptive recognition ever occurs—that is, they presume that the state 
ascribes obligations on couples only following the request of one of the part-
ners.  For example, upon the end of a nonmarital relationship, an ex-partner 
files a claim for equal distribution of the couple’s mutual property.  The state 
then places marital-like obligations on the couple and mandates the distribu-
tion of property.  In reality, however, purely ascriptive recognition—cases in 
which the state recognizes such couples without the request of either partner—
already occurs in some circumstances.21  So far, legal scholarship has addressed 
only partially ascriptive recognition (which is generally referred to as simply 
ascriptive recognition), but has not recognized the subcategory of purely 
ascriptive recognition and its consequences.  
This Article focuses in particular on one form of purely ascriptive recog-
nition, which I term deprivative22 recognition: when neither partner will ben-
efit from recognition and yet the state still recognizes the relationship, a 
recognition that results in deprivation.  In cases of deprivative recognition, 
the state or other third party (such as an ex-spouse) requests that the relation-
ship be legally recognized ad-hoc, such that a benefit stemming from the 
  
17. See infra Part I.A. 
18. See infra Part I.B. 
19. See infra Part I.A.2. 
20. As I discuss in Part I, gaining from nonrecognition could mean simply maintaining the status 
quo, such as not getting married, or could mean changing status from married to divorced, to 
being unrecognized by the law.  What I do not discuss are the cases in which people get 
married only in order to gain benefits that are attached to marriage.  For a discussion of such 
cases, see Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
21. See infra Part III (discussing the differences between partially and purely ascriptive recognition). 
22. Deprivative (adjective):  
tending to deprive, causing deprivation, relating to deprivation. 
 COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (Gerry Breslin Ed., 2011). 
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nonrecognition may be withheld or terminated.23  For example, the cohabitation-
termination rule, which has been adopted in most states, provides that upon 
cohabitation with a new partner, an alimony recipient loses her alimony.24    
Deprivative recognition and the financial advantages of nonrecognition 
lie at the crossroads of family law and poverty law.  The way that public policy—
especially as reflected in the U.S. welfare system—affects people’s marital 
choices has been the subject of much debate.25  But the effects of deprivative 
recognition and the gain from nonrecognition within the broader law and 
policy regarding unmarried partnerships remain virtually unexplored.26   
This Article thus juxtaposes cases in which the state identifies and terminates 
benefits that stem from nonrecognition (for example, termination of alimony 
upon the recipient’s cohabitation) with cases in which the state turns a blind 
eye to the financial advantages of nonrecognition (such as with Supplemental 
Security Income, income tax, and survivor’s benefits).  By comparing the benefits 
that are terminated upon cohabitation with the benefits that remain, this 
Article theorizes deprivative recognition as a selective regulatory mechanism.  
I argue that deprivative recognition targets what social conservatives see as 
immoral behaviors like cohabitation after divorce and reliance on welfare, 
  
23. Thus, it is not only the partner’s plea to the state that differentiates partially ascriptive and 
deprivative recognition.  Rather, partially ascriptive recognition aims to redress an economic 
injustice that stems from the misrecognition of the relationships, while, as this Article shows, 
deprivative recognition results in the privation of essential financial resources.  See infra Part 
III (defining deprivative recognition).  As I discuss in Parts III and IV, it is possible that 
some other sort of purely ascriptive recognition will not be deprivative.  
24. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the cohabitation-termination doctrine). 
25. See, e.g., Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm, The Effects of Public Policy on Marital Status in 
the United States, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 75, 76 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-
Shechtman, ed., 2003) (“The U.S. welfare system has probably generated more controversy 
about how public policy affects human behavior than any other program.”). 
26. As has been recognized for almost a decade, the two fields of family law and poverty law 
generally operate separately.  Part of this Article’s contribution is in joining the scholarship 
that aims to integrate them.  See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 825, 832 (2004) (“The exclusion of welfare law from the family law canon has allowed 
legal authorities to avoid explaining why the law applies very different rules to govern familial 
rights and responsibilities in poor families.”); see also Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of 
Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229,  229 (2000) (“Family law and welfare law share a 
connectedness that has not been extensively addressed by scholars in either the family law or 
welfare law arenas.”); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family 
Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 753, 764 (2010) (Family law, as reflected in modern family law codes, courses, bar exams, 
and casebooks, “begins to look like a collection of the legal issues about the formation and 
dissolution of formal family relationships; the legal issues affecting the ongoing life of family 
relationships are almost all housed in other courses!  This exclusion is stunning, when you 
think about it.”). 
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while validating other kinds of assistance that they deem socially acceptable.27  
Further, this Article suggests that the more deprivative recognition expands, 
the more it will burden and impede the creation of new kinship networks because 
of concerns about the financial loss that may result, or about the intrusive and 
bureaucratic nature of deprivative recognition.28 
I contend that deprivative recognition is an asymmetrical apparatus.  
Couples are recognized only for the purpose of terminating a benefit; they are 
not recognized when it is a matter of gaining most of the partnership rights 
that would otherwise stem from these same relationships.  (Often, the law 
does not even ascribe legally binding financial obligations between the now-
recognized partners upon their separation).  In this way, deprivative recognition 
often leads to economic maldistribution: The deprivatively recognized couples 
may not support each other financially, nor are they obliged to do so—even 
when recognition results in cutting off an individual from a vital source of income 
(such as alimony or welfare).29 
If, as this Article puts forward, legal recognition is not always tantamount to 
cultural and economic justice, and cultural recognition can result in economic 
injustice, what kind of law would be able to protect the needs of unmarried 
partners without causing misrecognition or maldistribution?  Indeed, deprivative 
recognition reflects a very great dilemma in family law and thus invites explo-
ration of a larger strategic problem: On the one hand, pursuing redistributive justice 
independently from cultural recognition, and vice versa, would result in a lack of 
justice for unmarried couples.  Yet on the other hand, simultaneously pursuing 
redistribution and cultural recognition can result in one undercutting the other.30 
Legal scholars have overlooked the tension inherent in simultaneously 
pursuing both distributive justice and cultural recognition in family law.  But 
the interplay of the two has stood in the center of discussions in political science 
and moral philosophy for almost twenty years.31  The history is instructive.  In 
the 1960s, cultural recognition of differences became the primary political 
demand in the United States and other Western developed democracies and 
has remained such.  Subsequently, in the 1990s, a few influential theoreticians 
  
27. Cf. Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129, 182 
(2003) (“[T]ransfer payments to assist needy children and their caregivers are considered 
pathological (‘welfare as we know it’), while transfer payments for widowed and disabled 
persons stay respectable, a kind of insurance.” (footnote omitted)). 
28. See infra Part III.A.3. 
29. See id.  
30. For examples of how redistributional and recognitional remedies can undercut each other in 
the regulation of unmarried partnerships, see infra Part IV.B. 
31. See infra Part IV.A. 
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contended that cultural recognition is the most important aspiration for polit-
ical movements to pursue.  But in 1995, the prominent critical scholar Nancy 
Fraser challenged the adequacy of recognition as the preeminent social-justice 
claim.32  While Fraser accepted the importance of recognition, she proposed a 
model of redistribution and recognition as “folk paradigms of justice.”33  In order 
to pursue the two aspects of justice concurrently, she distinguished between 
transformative remedies, which aim to correct social injustice at the root, and 
affirmative remedies, focused only on correcting specific problems.34  She asserted 
that nothing short of adopting transformative recognition and redistribution 
remedies (rather than affirmative remedies) would “meet the requirements of 
justice for all” while avoiding the ostensible dichotomy and contradiction between 
the two.35 
Fraser’s insight provides a critical addition to the law of unmarried couples.  
Building on her work, I argue that while redistribution and recognition have, 
de facto, long been at the center of family law, major proposals in the field fail 
to encompass both components.  I submit that the law of unmarried partners 
ought to be based on a perspective that acknowledges the important of both 
cultural recognition and redistribution—in pursuing a just policy to accommodate 
unmarried partners, both aims are crucial, and a policy that is based on these 
foundations will avoid retrograde policies like deprivative recognition.   
Extrapolating from Fraser’s framework, I catalogue major proposals and 
theories concerning recognition of nonmarital unions that arise in family law 
scholarship.  I sort these approaches according to their remedies and evaluate 
which theories fail to achieve, and which succeed in achieving, the dual perspec-
tives of cultural recognition and equitable economic redistribution.  While 
this theoretical examination reveals significant tensions between legal policies 
that aim mainly to remedy cultural misrecognition and those invested mainly 
in redistribution, I offer an analysis, in general terms, of which proposals 
and policies could be reconciled and how this could be done.    
This Article is organized into four Parts.  Part I explores the possible financial 
benefits of nonrecognition.  Part II lays out the argument that the rise in the 
  
32. See Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ 
Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV. 68, 70–74 (1995). 
33. NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A 
POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 11 (Joel Golb et al. trans., 2003) (“[I]n their 
political reference . . . the terms ‘redistribution’ and ‘recognition’ refer not to philosophical 
paradigms but rather to folk paradigms of justice, which inform present-day struggles in civil 
society.”). 
34. Fraser, supra note 32, at 82–86. 
35. Id. at 93. 
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number of complex family structures, has resulted in dignitary harm and 
economic injustice to people in nonmarital unions, contra marriage 
exceptionalism in the United States.  The Article then critiques the main theories 
and proposals for the treatment of nonmarital unions—which are referred to 
collectively as the trend toward recognition—for failing to take into account 
their impact on those who currently gain financially from being unrecog-
nized.  Part III presents the unacknowledged policy of deprivative recognition 
as a selective regulatory mechanism, and offers four critiques of that policy.  
Part IV explores social justice recognition claims more broadly, proposing a 
shift toward a theory of recognition and redistribution in the law governing 
unmarried partners. 
I. THE POTENTIAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS OF NONRECOGNITION 
Joe Entwisle and his girlfriend have been together for a decade but do 
not get married because, if they do, Joe, who is paralyzed from the shoulders 
down, will lose his Medicaid benefits, which are essential to his daily life.36  
Hillary St. Pierre had health insurance but, like others, when she developed 
cancer she contemplated “Medicaid divorce” in order to get better coverage 
and avoid bankrupting the entire family.37  Angela and David Boyter got divorced 
to avoid the tax “marriage penalty.”38  And US News & World Report advises 
students and their families that “[t]here may be a big financial aid reward if 
you choose a delay [in marriage] or simply cohabitation.”39  These are only a 
few examples of how people can benefit economically from their nonmarital 
status. 
Who comprises the major groups that gain financially from 
nonrecognition, by what methods do they gain, and how pervasive is this 
phenomenon?  These are difficult questions, and this Article cannot and does 
  
36. Stacy Forster, Disability Rule Change Sought: Marrying Can Lead to Loss of Vital Medicaid 
Coverage, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 2, 2008, at 1B. 
37. Hillary St. Pierre, I Considered A “Medicaid Divorce” When Cancer Began Bankrupting Me, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hillary-st-pierre/i-
considered-a-medicaid-d_b_816668.html; see also Michael L. Olver & Christopher C. Lee, 
Medicaid Divorce: An Overview, HELSELL FETTERMAN (Dec. 2010), www.helsell.com/ 
helsell-news/medicaid-divorce-an-overview. 
38. See Boyter v. Comm'r, 668 F.2d 1382, 1383–84 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that the sham 
transaction doctrine could be applied to married taxpayers who divorce in order to avoid the 
marriage penalty). 
39. Kim Clark, How to Maximize Your Student's Chances for Need-Based Aid, US NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2008/04/10/how-to-
maximize-your-students-chances-for-need-based-aid. 
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not purport to provide exhaustive answers.  Giving accurate statistics and 
information about the pervasiveness of the occurrence is impossible because 
the census (and other sources) does not examine how many of the nonmarital 
households gain financially from their nonrecognition.40  Other difficulties in 
providing quantitative and qualitative accounts of the phenomenon stem 
from the ethics of gaining financially from nonrecognition.  While for some, 
gaining from nonrecognition could be a side effect of an independent life 
choice (such as, having the relationship one wants), for others it could be a 
strategic behavior to avoid the financial loss that derives from legal recognition.41  
And it is not easy—sometimes it is even impossible—to distinguish between 
those who are unmarried because of their fear of financial loss attached to 
recognition and those who are unmarried for other reasons (and some may of 
course be motivated by both financial loss and other reasons). 
To clarify, I am not implying that the main motivation behind living in 
unmarried relationships is to increase eligibility for means-tested programs or 
to avoid losing entitlements.  The effect of welfare policies on marriage and 
cohabitation is a highly contested one.42  But even if the decision not to get 
married is based solely on a desire to avoid financial loss, it does not necessarily raise 
an ethical problem.  Some partnerships are simply unrecognized by the state, and, 
  
40. Moreover, until recently it was difficult to identify the range of nonmarital relationships in 
the United States.  See Sheela Kennedy & Catherine A. Fitch, Measuring Cohabitation and 
Family Structure in the United States: Assessing the Impact of New Data From the Current 
Population Survey, 49 DEMOGRAPHY 1479, 1480 (2012) (explaining how, prior to 2007, the 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey documented 
only persons who reported themselves as “unmarried partners” of the householder, and how 
the change since then allows the state to better identify different sorts of nonmarital unions); 
see also Sven Drefahl, Do the Married Really Live Longer? The Role of Cohabitation and 
Socioeconomic Status, 74 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 462, 463 (2012) (“More and more individuals 
are classified as never married, widowed, or divorced, even though they are living with a 
partner.”). 
41. Compare Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Mothers Don’t Marry or Remarry, AM. 
PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 26, 31 (reporting that she has found “virtually no support for the 
welfare disincentives argument, since very few mothers say that they have avoided marriage or 
remarriage to maintain eligibility for welfare, even when asked directly”), with Maxine 
Eichner, Beyond Private Ordering: Families and the Supportive Stat, 23 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 305, 306 (2010) (“Social Security survivors’ benefits influence some 
recipients not to marry.”), and Marsha Garrison, Reviving Marriage: Could We? Should We?, 
10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 279, 296 (2008) (“[P]olicies that distinguish cohabitation from 
marriage invite evasion and contribute to the decline of formal marriage if those policies 
attach significant financial benefits to nonmarriage.”). 
42. See, e.g., Lisa A. Gennetian & Virginia Knox, Staying Single: The Effects of Welfare Reform 
Policies on Marriage and Cohabitation 1–5 (Next Generation, Working Paper No. 13, 2003) 
(surveying some of the disagreements about the connection between welfare programs and 
motivation to marry); Whittington & Alm, supra note 25, at 76. 
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for them, the concomitant financial gain is unavoidable.  If the state does not 
impose any mutual obligations on friends or same-sex couples, then there is 
nothing unethical in accepting the financial gain that accrues from these statuses.43  
Further, if opposite-sex couples who can get married feel that they are unready 
to do so, or do not want the marital status for ideological reasons, then their gain 
from nonrecognition is a side effect of their relationship.  In fact, when partners 
are asked about their relationship on official forms, most often the options are 
“married,” “divorced,” or “single,” so they cannot declare a different status.44  
And those who do not get married in order to be better off financially are no dif-
ferent from those who get married to gain marital benefits—a legitimate and 
widely accepted practice.45  (I refer not to the practice of getting married “fictively” 
solely to get marital benefits, but to the common practice of considering marital 
benefits in the decision to get married.)  Finally, the state itself creates domestic 
partnerships registrations, open to elderly only, in order to allow these partners 
to avoid the termination of post-marital benefits, but allowing them to enjoy 
state protections that otherwise are reserved only to married couples. In other 
words, in the case of elderly population (perhaps because the group holds 
considerable political power) the state supports strategic behavior with regard to 
benefits that stem from nonrecognition.   
Before I proceed, one important caveat is in order.  By documenting the 
financial gains that stem from legal nonrecognition, this Article does not 
deny the cultural significance that is attached to marriage, particularly in U.S. 
society.46  Nor does the Article disregard the financial perks that attach to marriage.  
Clearly, nonrecognition can come with many economic disadvantages—as has 
  
43. See, e.g., Axel Berryhill, FAFSA to Include Options for Reporting Same-sex Parents Starting 
2014, http://www.dailycal.org/2013/05/01/department-of-education-announces-that-fafsa-
will-include-options-to-report-same-sex-parents-starting-2014 (last updated May 2, 2013) 
(telling the story of an unmarried lesbian couple’s daughter who “has no way to fully tell the 
truth when applying for financial aid”). 
44. Cf. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, Civil Marriage v. Civil Unions (2012), available at http://www. 
now.org/issues/marriage/marriage_unions.html (“Every day we fill out forms that ask us 
whether we are married, single, divorced or widowed. People joined in a civil union do not fit 
in any of those categories.”). 
45. See Nancy F. Cott, No Objections, What History Tells Us About Remaking Marriage, BOS. REV. 
(Jan. 1, 2011), http://bostonreview.net/nancy-f-cott-no-objections-history-of-marriage-same-sex-
gay (“Governments at all levels in the United States have long encouraged people to marry for 
economic benefit to the public as well as to themselves.”); For Many Americans, “Marriage Is an 
Economic Decision,” Sociologist Says, NPR (Sept. 29, 2010), www.npr.org/templates/transcript/ 
transcript.php?storyId=130218357 (interviewing Andrew J. Cherlin, who says that “marriage is an 
economic decision”). 
46. Erez Aloni, Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 105, 141 n.213 (2010) (discussing the 
value of marriage in American society compared to European countries). 
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been emphasized in almost every article and court case on the subject.47  And 
marriage has other invaluable benefits, such as parental presumptions and 
decisionmaking privileges, the absence of which often requires people to go 
through expensive and emotionally exhausting procedures.48  Instead, the 
argument herein is that, in some cases, the financial benefits of nonrecognition 
trump the other potential benefits of marriage.  In addition, in a regime in 
which people can get married and divorced fairly easily, a couple could gain 
from nonrecognition and then change its status to enjoy the privileges of marriage; 
later, they could divorce and enjoy the value of nonrecognition.49  This fluidi-
ty is available only to couples who can get married in the first place.50  Finally, 
the benefits from nonrecognition are often time-limited; thus, in order to enjoy 
these benefits, individuals typically must not remain unmarried forever but ra-
ther just delay marriage.  For example, welfare grants provided by Temporary As-
sistance for Needy Families (TANF) are limited to five years, and educational 
financial aid is limited to the time one pursues academic studies.51 
Below, I divide the potential gain from nonrecognition into three central 
categories.  First, nonmarital status matters in relation to programs for which 
applicant’s eligibility and benefit level is means-tested (such as financial aid, 
Medicaid, TANF, and Social Security Disability Insurance).52  Second, 
nonmarital status matters vis-à-vis entitlements that commence upon the 
ending of the previous marriage, and that are, in some cases, terminated upon 
remarriage (such as alimony and survivors’ benefits).  Third, marital status 
matters in cases in which the state or third parties treat the unmarried partners as 
  
47. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006) (“It is undisputed that the 
benefits of marriage are many.”). 
48. For example, in the absence of marriage, a partner who wants to have medical 
decisionmaking prerogatives needs either to have a power of attorney, or, in a minority of 
states, to register with the state.  See NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND 
GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 160–61 (2008).  Without 
parental presumption, the nonbiological parent must go through adoption procedures.  See 
Clare Huntington, Negative Family Law, in FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW 
UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS ch.4 (forthcoming 2014). 
49. See Abrams, supra note 20, at 46.  (“The possibility of ‘divorce on demand’ created the 
potential for the widespread instrumental use of marriage as a vehicle for opting into 
particular benefits of marriage and then opting out before the burdens became oppressive.”). 
50. Thus, for instance, if a college student couple benefits from their nonmarital status by 
receiving more financial aid, they can get married upon graduation and enjoy the marriage-
tax bonus. 
51. Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of Dependency, 
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 469 (2005) (“TANF established a five-year 
lifetime limit on welfare assistance and significantly toughened work requirements.”). 
52. FREDERICK HERTZ, COUNSELING UNMARRIED COUPLES: A GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE 
LEGAL REPRESENTATION 67, 195–96 (2011). 
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separate economic units for the purpose of realizing potential liability (rather 
than assistance, as in category one), while the married are treated as one economic 
unit (such as income tax, bankruptcy,53 and joint liability for shared debts54).  I 
elaborate briefly on all broad categories but not on every possible benefit 
within each category.55  I look more fully at the first category (means-tested 
programs) because it is most relevant for the population that typically lives in 
nonmarital unions in the United States.  The second category, post-marital 
entitlements, is markedly relevant to the lives of unmarried partners too, but I 
explore it further in Part III.A.1 in the context of deprivative recognition.  
The third category, involving tax, bankruptcy, and joint liability, represents 
an important venue of fiscal gain, but it is less correlated with the profile of 
U.S. cohabitants, so I present it only briefly.56 
A. Means-Tested Assistance 
Generally, eligibility for means-tested assistance is calculated on the basis of 
the means possessed by the applicant (income and assets).57  When the law 
recognizes the applicants’ relationship, the state considers the partner’s wealth 
as part of the overall family wealth in determining eligibility and benefit level.58  
  
53. Filing for joint bankruptcy is limited to spouses.  11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).  Often, filing 
jointly is an advantage because it can save the costs and fees of filing two separate claims, and 
because consolidation is financially beneficial.  See A. Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor, 
and (Oh!) Pay: Should Spouses Be Forced to Pay Each Other's Debts?, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 961, 975–
87 (1998).  But being treated as married could be a disadvantage because the “means test” 
includes income from nearly any source to the debtor or the debtor’s spouse.  11 U.S.C. § 
101(10A) (2006). 
54. HERTZ, supra note 52, at 93–100. 
55. For a more comprehensive—but not exhaustive and not updated—list of possible financial 
advantages for nonmarried couples, see Wendell E. Primus & Jennifer Beeson, Safety Net 
Programs, Marriage, and Cohabitation, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF 
COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, AND SOCIAL POLICY 170, 176–81 (Alan 
Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002). 
56. To suffer the marriage penalty, a couple needs to be “dual earning, middle income.”  This is 
less typically the profile of cohabitants in the United States.  In addition, the marriage penalty 
could be balanced by other benefits provided by marriage that are more typical for those in 
the upper middle class, such as the estate-tax exemption.  But for elderly couples, one of the 
main groups of cohabitants in the United States, joint liability as a result of marriage can be 
very important.  See John R. Schleppenbach, Strange Bedfellows: Why Older Straight Couples 
Should Advocate for the Passage of the Illinois Civil Union Act, 17 ELDER L.J. 31, 40 (2009) 
(“Older individuals who contemplate remarriage may also be justifiably concerned about 
protecting their individual wealth and avoiding the liabilities of a potential spouse.”). 
57. In the case of financial aid for college, it is sometimes the wealth of the parents that matters.  
See infra Part I.A.2. 
58. In other programs—like food stamps and Section 8 assistance—eligibility is calculated based 
on household income, regardless of marital status.  HERTZ, supra note 52, at 197–98.  For 
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Depending on the partner’s income level, not being recognized as a family 
unit may or may not be advantageous.  Usually, because eligibility is restricted 
to the poorest, the addition of even the smallest income could render someone 
unqualified.  For example, under the 2013 federal guidelines, the poverty level 
for one person is $11,490 per year, while for a household of two it is $15,510.  
Thus, often, adding the wealth of another person increases the assets owned 
together and eliminates eligibility.59  Other times, however, especially if the 
nonapplicant partner is poorer, not including the partner’s income may result 
in a loss because the total household income would not be divided by the actual 
number of family members. 
Eligibility for means-tested assistance is very relevant to many nonmarital 
households in the United States—there is a correlation between the population 
eligible for means-based assistance and the demographic of people in 
nonmarital unions.  Looking at shared income earned in the years 2006–2008, 
close to 11 percent of households composed of nonmarital unions lived below 
the poverty line.60  Since this calculation is based on the income of both partners—
which is not calculated in most means-tested programs—it thus reflects lower 
numbers than the actual percentage of cohabiting couples who are likely to 
rely on means-based programs.61  A different and more traditional calculation 
in 2009 found that among cohabitants without college degrees, 31 percent 
lived below the poverty line (compared with 9 percent of married adults without 
college degrees).62  There is, thus, a solid correlation between living in 
nonmarital households and eligibility for means-tested programs in the United 
States. 
  
this reason, I do not discuss these programs below.  But even in these cases, being unmarried 
can be helpful, as some women live with “a ‘shadowed’ cohabiting partner, who unofficially 
occupies the home as a contributing member but whose presence is concealed from housing and 
public assistance authorities.”  Marya Leroy Dantzer, Place, Face, Space: How Housing Assistance 
and Household Composition Shape Low-Income Mothers’ Access to Resources 158 (Apr. 
2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern University) (on file with author), 
available at http://hdl.handle.net/2047/d20002467. 
59. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 
108 (2010); cf. Kennedy & Fitch, supra note 40, at 1485 (“Including cohabiting partner 
incomes in family poverty measurements more completely accounts for the economic 
resources available in cohabiting families and thus substantially reduces estimated poverty rates.”). 
60. Kennedy & Fitch, supra note 40, at 1493. 
61. John Iceland, Measuring Poverty With Different Units of Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF 
MEASUREMENT ISSUES IN FAMILY RESEARCH 221, 222–23 (Sandra L. Hofferth & Lynn 
M. Casper eds., 2007). 
62. Richard Fry & D’Vera Cohn, Living Together: The Economics of Cohabitation, PEW SOCIAL & 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (June 27, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/06/27/living-
together-the-economics-of-cohabitation/2/#i-prevalence-and-growth-of-cohabitation. 
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The other prominent group of cohabitants that is linked to means-tested 
assistance is students in higher education, who can use their relationship status (or 
their parents’) to increase their eligibility—not only for financial aid from the 
federal government, but for other support from the university and for external 
grants.  Below, I examine more thoroughly two of the programs that can ben-
efit the unrecognized. 
1. Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid 
Title XVI of the Social Security Act establishes Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), a means-tested program that assists people over sixty-five years 
old, or who are blind or disabled and do not have sufficient income and resources 
to maintain a standard of living at the established federal minimum-income 
level.63  In many states, if a person is eligible for SSI, she is automatically 
qualified for Medicaid.64  Since Medicaid provides free access to a variety of 
expensive medical treatments, often it is essential to preserve SSI eligibility in 
order to ensure access to Medicaid.65 
Being in unrecognized relationships can be substantially advantageous 
for the purpose of eligibility for SSI.66  First, in the case of spouses who live 
together, if one spouse is ineligible for SSI, the Social Security Administration 
deems a portion of that spouse’s income or assets as part of the claimant’s income.67  
Second, the amount that is granted to two eligible spouses is smaller than the 
amount granted to two eligible individuals.  Thus, in 2014, the monthly payment 
that eligible married couples received from the federal government was $1082.68  
If partners were unmarried and both were eligible for SSI, each individual received 
$721 a month, a combined amount of $1442.69  In both cases, these are solid fi-
nancial enticements for low-income people. 
  
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2006). 
64. Understanding Supplemental Security Income (SSI): SSI and Eligibility for Other Government 
and State Programs, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-other-ussi.htm 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Understanding Supplemental Security Income]. 
65. James R. Sheldon, Jr. & Diana M. Straube, Disability, Divorce, SSI, and Medicaid: Using 
Creative Alimony, Child Support and Property Settlements to Maximize SSI, Ensure Medicaid 
Eligibility, and Create Funding for Assistive Technology, (Nat’l Assistive Tech. Advoc. Project, 
Neighborhood Legal Services Inc., Buffalo, N.Y.), Sept. 2008, available at http://www.nls.org/files/ 
Disability%20Law%20Hotlines/National%20AT%20Advocacy/DisabilityDivorce.pdf. 
66. Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage Penalties and Support 
Anomalies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 566–68 (2006) (explaining the marriage penalty for 
married couples who receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI)). 
67. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1802(a)(1) (2008). 
68. Understanding Supplemental Security Income, supra note 64. 
69. Id.  
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The state is not entirely blind, however, to the possibility that a 
nonspouse is supporting the applicant.  The Social Security Administration 
defines income as “anything you receive in cash or in kind that you can use to 
meet your needs for food and shelter.”70  Accordingly, if an applicant’s unmarried 
partner is paying the rent, for example, the Administration may count part of 
that payment in determining the applicant’s benefit eligibility.71  In addition, 
to prevent “fraud,”72 the Code of Federal Regulations determines that the parties do 
not have to be legally married to be considered spouses for the purposes of SSI eli-
gibility—they only need to hold themselves out as a married couple.73  Ac-
cordingly, a claimant for SSI benefits who states on her application that she is 
unmarried and is living in the same household with an unrelated, opposite-sex 
person could be deemed married if the couple “lead[s] people to believe that 
[they] are each other’s husband and wife.”74  But most nonrecognized partners 
do not fall under the definition of “holding themselves out” as husband and 
wife as interpreted by the Social Security Administration, and thereby still 
enjoy the benefits of the unmarried status for purposes of SSI and Medicaid.75 
  
70. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (2008). 
71. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1131 (2008). 
72. Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the goal of the “deemed 
married” provision is, inter alia, the prevention of fraud). 
73. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1816 (2008). 
74. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1826(c)(2) (2008). 
75. For the Social Security Administration to determine whether the couple holds itself out as 
husband and wife, the applicant needs to answer the following questions: what names the two 
are known by; whether they introduce themselves as husband and wife, or, if not, how they 
are introduced; what names are used on the mail for each of them; who owns or rents the 
place where they live; and whether any deeds, leases, time payment papers, tax papers, or any 
other papers show the couple as husband and wife.  20 C.F.R. § 416.1826(c)(1)(i)–(v) (2008).  
The Social Security Administration is not bound by a state’s definition of “marriage” for this 
purpose; and “deemed married” is not limited to a state’s definition of “common law 
marriage” (which is recognized only in a minority of states).  Barbara Samuels, Basic Social 
Security Retirement and Basic SSI Eligibility Requirements, 143 PRACTICING LAW 
INSTITUTE NEW YORK LAW 41 N1 (2004) (“‘Holding out’ is a concept unique to SSI.  It 
has no relationship to the concept of common law marriage.”).  But the above-listed 
questions, which are written into the regulation, are, indeed, similar to those required for 
proof of valid common law marriage.  See GÖRAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A 
LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITATION 511–14 (2008).  Notably, the definition of 
“holding themselves out as a married couple” seems to present a high bar for proving such 
behavior: to be deemed as holding themselves out as a married couple, the couple should use a 
single last name, introduce themselves as husband and wife, and so on—practices that seem 
less typical for most cohabitants today than in the past.  See id. at 913–14.  Indeed, one of the 
reasons that common law marriage is hard to prove is that most people do not “present 
themselves as husband and wife” today.  See id. at 564–65. 
  No wonder, then, that the only reported court decision that upheld the Social Security 
Administration’s decision to deem an unmarried couple as married includes a unique set of 
facts in which the couple demonstrated that they held each other out as married: the wife 
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Similarly, nonmarital households can gain significantly from 
nonrecognition with respect to their eligibility for Medicaid.  One example is 
the way informal partners are financially privileged (compared to recognized 
couples) when one of them requires nursing-home services.  Since long-term 
care is very expensive, Medicaid has become a common source to fund nursing-
home care.76  According to the spousal impoverishment provisions of the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988,77 “all of a couple’s resources are 
considered in determining Medicaid eligibility regardless of whether the assets are 
jointly or separately held.”78  The institutionalized spouse can qualify for 
Medicaid if the couple “spends down” their assets on the hospitalization—for 
example, if the couple spends their money until the appropriate asset limit is 
reached.79  Theoretically, if the partners are unmarried and keep their finances 
separate,80 the noninstitutionalized person can keep her personal assets yet 
have Medicaid pay for the hospitalization of her partner.81 
The valuable advantages for unmarried couples described above have induced 
a noticeable number of couples to engage in “Medicaid divorce,” since the 
medical costs of one spouse can force the couple to deplete its assets, leaving 
the other spouse impoverished.82  While statistical studies about the size of 
this phenomenon do not exist, the observable amount of anecdotal evidence—
from court cases, legal guides for lawyers on how to handle such divorces, and 
newspaper articles—testifies that this is not a marginal occurrence.83  Medicaid di-
  
wrote on the SSI application that, while they are not married, “they hold themselves out to 
the community as husband and wife,” and on a variety of other occasions they presented 
themselves as husband and wife.  Smith v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 186, 187–88 (C.D. Ill. 
1991).  In the second reported case, in which the court rejected the Social Security 
Administration’s finding that deemed a couple as married, the court noted that cohabitation 
“is not a dispositive factor to be considered in the analysis.”  Brown v. Apfel, No. 98-CIV-
2915-HB, 1999 WL 144515, at *1, *3 (S.D. N.Y. Mar. 16, 1999). 
76. Andrew D. Wone, Don’t Want to Pay for Your Institutionalized Spouse? The Role of Spousal 
Refusal and Medicaid in Funding Long Term Care, 14 ELDER L.J. 485, 490–501 (2006). 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2006). 
78. McNamara v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 744 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). 
79. But the noninstitutionalized spouse retains a small part of the couple’s resources without 
affecting the eligibility of the institutionalized spouse. 
80. Cf. HERTZ, supra note 52, at 196. 
81. On the other hand, the status of “married” can be beneficial because it exempts jointly owned homes 
from the spend-down requirement—a noteworthy advantage that nonmarital partners cannot enjoy.  
Most unmarried partners, however, do not need this exemption in the first place. 
82. Cf. Olver & Lee, supra note 37 (“Since recent changes to Medicaid rules in May 2006, the 
‘Medicaid divorce’ has been resurrected as a planning tool.”).  
83. Lawmakers did not ignore this phenomenon, constantly stating that “using a divorce 
proceeding to accelerate Medicaid . . . violates public policy in general and the underlying 
policy of the Medicaid Act.”  H.K. v. Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs., 878 A.2d 
16, 19 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
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vorce presents a slightly different ethical question because it requires changing a 
status rather than merely maintaining the status quo of staying unmarried.84  
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to focus on the way that unmarried 
couples (rather than those who get divorced to achieve eligibility) can gain 
from Medicaid. 
2. Financial Aid for Higher Education 
Eligibility for financial aid in postsecondary education is determined by 
the Federal Student Aid, an office of the U.S. Department of Education.  To 
qualify for financial aid and determine the level of support that she is eligible 
for, a student is required to fill out the Free Application for Federal Student 
Aid form (FAFSA).85  The more financially needy the student is, the more 
aid the student receives (up to a maximum level).  The FAFSA is often also 
used by colleges and universities to determine eligibility for nonfederal scholarships 
and is required by virtually every U.S. college and university.86 
  
84. Ethically speaking, Medicaid divorce presents a slightly different situation than those that 
were previously discussed, such as SSI and financial aid.  The difference is that here couples 
who may already be responsible to one another, and may have enjoyed some protections of 
marriage, get divorced to avoid financial loss.  While such an action can, in some cases, be 
unethical, I do not think that it should be categorically perceived as unethical.  The question 
of ethics here should be examined case by case, according to the specific couple and the 
specific circumstances.  If the couple was economically and emotionally interdependent, there 
may be a reason to view such act as unethical; but, in other cases, marriage status does not 
mean that the couple had obligations that warrant combining their assets.  In any event, the 
ethical question is not material for purpose of this article.  For a discussion of the ethics of 
Medicaid divorce, see Randy Cohen, Get A Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002, (“Ultimately, 
the question is who should pay for your husband's care: Medicaid or you, the late-in-life 
spouse?  To me the answer is both.  You should assist him but should not be utterly 
impoverished.  And Medicaid should be reformed so as to spare you this painful dilemma.  
Medicaid rules envision a couple in a lifelong economic partnership.  While this is true of 
many couples, it is not the case for those like you who marry late in life.”); see also Abrams, 
supra note 20, at 56–58 (arguing that marriage is a poor proxy for eligibility for benefits and 
entitlements because marital status does not necessarily reflect interdependency). 
85. See Forms and Worksheets, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/PORTALSWeb 
App/students/english/forms.jsp (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).  Using the information provided 
on the Free Application for Federal Student Aid form (FAFSA), Federal Student Aid 
calculates the student’s financial need based on his financial situation and the tuition costs of 
the schools to which he is applying.  Caroline Waldner, In Defense of College Savings Plans: 
Using 529 Plans to Increase the Impact of Direct Federal Grants for Higher Education to Low-and 
Moderate-Income Students, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 97, 128 n.101 (2011). 
86. CROSBY BURNS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, UNEQUAL AID: DISCRIMINATORY 
TREATMENT OF GAY AND TRANSGENDER APPLICANTS AND FAMILIES HEADED BY 
SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCIAL AID PROCESS 5 (2011). 
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In evaluating financial need, Federal Student Aid divides students into 
two statuses: “dependent” on or “independent” of their parents for their tui-
tion.  Dependent students must report their parents’ income and assets, as 
well as their own, on the FAFSA.87  Federal student aid programs are based 
on the concept that a dependent student’s parents have the primary responsi-
bility for paying for their child’s education.88  Family status could benefit the 
student in two ways: First, if the student is dependent and her parents are 
unmarried, it may reduce the total expected family contribution.  Second, if 
the student is independent, she would benefit by nondisclosure of her partner’s 
income.89 
Until the 2013–14 academic year, financial aid was one of the venues in 
which unmarried students and students with unmarried parents could gain 
from nonrecognition.  But even under the new federal regulation discussed in 
the introduction, students whose unmarried parents do not live together still 
enjoy a significant financial advantage over similarly situated students with 
married parents.  Additionally, the change in the rule has not eliminated the 
possible advantage of independent (from their parents) unmarried partners. 
For purposes of determining the expected family contribution of the 
student’s unmarried parents—whether the parents are divorced or were never 
married—the dependent student should include on the FAFSA information 
about the parent with whom she lived longer during the twelve months before 
the date she completes the application.  Thus, in many cases, if the legal parent in-
formally lives with another person who is not the legal parent of the applicant and 
not married to the applicant’s parent, the other partner’s income would not be 
calculated, which would thus increase the student’s likelihood of eligibility 
significantly.  But, as stated before, if the applicant’s legal parents are unmar-
ried and share residency, both incomes will be calculated and will decrease the 
likelihood of eligibility and benefit level. 
To demonstrate, consider the following scenario: Sylvia, Lori’s mother, 
lives informally with Ari, who is not Lori’s father.  Although Sylvia and Ari 
are economically and emotionally interdependent, under the rules, because 
  
87. 2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVE INDEX, FEDERAL STUDENT AID AVG-21 (2011), available 
at https://ifap.ed.gov/ifap/byAwardYear.jsp?type=fsahandbook&awardyear=2011-2012. 
88. Id. 
89. Of course, for the purposes of federal student aid, being married is beneficial for some 
couples.  According to the FAFSA, married couples, even those under twenty-four years old, 
are considered independent, which is most often an advantage.  Id.  In another scenario, the 
student applicant could have a spouse with an income lower than hers, which would increase 
the household’s total income but also increase the family’s household size. 
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they are unmarried,90 Ari’s income and presence in the household would not 
be included on the application.  That could inflate Lori’s financial aid package 
significantly.91  Now assume that Ari and Sylvia are married (but still, Ari has 
not legally adopted Lori or assumed other legal responsibility for her expenses 
and well-being).  Since information about stepparents, even with an existing 
prenuptial agreement, is considered on the application,92 Lori will need to report 
both incomes, thus arriving at a higher income, with three recognized persons 
in her household. 
In another scenario, Lori is a graduate student with no income, under 
independent status because graduate students are automatically considered inde-
pendent.93  Lori is engaged to Tom, whose annual income is $100,000.  They have 
been dating for ten years and Tom has been very financially supportive of 
Lori.94  Under the rules, much of Tom’s support would be considered “in-kind 
support,” which is not included on the application form.95  In sum, Lori’s status as 
unmarried would probably increase the chances of her being eligible for fi-
nancial aid. 
It is thus safe to say that, even under the new rule, in an unknown number of 
cases, living in informal relationships or having unmarried parents (who do 
not share residence) is financially beneficial to people applying for student fi-
nancial aid.  Because, as stated before, students are a major group of cohabitants 
and so are those in post-marital unions (parents of the students), financial aid 
is a consequential instance in which nonrecognition is beneficial.96 
  
90. And assuming Ari does not contribute to more than half of Sylvia’s finances. 
91. BURNS, supra note 86, at 8–11.  
92. 2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVE INDEX, supra note 87, at AVG-29 (“A 
stepparent is treated like a biological parent if the stepparent has legally adopted the student 
or if the stepparent is married, as of the date of application, to a student’s biological or 
adoptive parent whose information will be reported on the FAFSA.  There are no exceptions.  
A prenuptial agreement does not exempt the stepparent from providing information required 
of a parent on the FAFSA.” (emphasis omitted)). 
93. Id. at AVG-22. 
94. Lori may need to report part of Tom’s support as “untaxed income” but not as spousal 
income.  Id. at AVG-20.  For example, if her name is listed on the apartment’s lease and Tom 
pays the rent, she needs to include this sum as support.  But if her name is not on the lease, 
she should not disclose the financial support.  Id.  If she is in a state that recognizes common 
law marriages and, under the terms of the state, she is in such a union, then she is considered 
married.  But only a minority of states recognize common law marriage, and even in those, it 
seems that Lori’s relationship might not be considered common law marriage—either 
because the couple does not introduce themselves as spouses or because their time living 
together would be considered a trial period, a premarital stage.  See LIND, supra note 75, at 
796–97. 
95. 2011–2012 FSA HANDBOOK WITH ACTIVE INDEX , supra note 87, at AVG-21. 
96. Indeed, universities in the United States have recognized that “financial aid at universities is 
often distorted for students with certain family circumstances,” and some universities employ their 
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B. Post-Marital Entitlements 
People who were previously married are one of the major groups who 
live outside of marriage in the United States.  In 2008, out of the total number of 
households with nonmarital unions, almost 28 percent were such that both 
partners were divorced, and 50 percent were such that at least one partner was 
divorced.97  Divorced and widowed people can gain from being in an unrecog-
nized relationship in four main areas: spousal support, Medicare, survivor’s 
benefits, and Social Security retirement benefits.  (In the case of spousal support, 
however, there is a good chance that even without remarriage the benefits will 
be terminated.  I discuss this further in Part III.A.1.) 
When a worker covered by Social Security dies, her surviving spouse (or 
her ex-spouse, provided that they had been married for at least ten years) is 
entitled to survivor’s benefits.98  But if the recipient remarries before she is 
sixty years old, or fifty if she is disabled, then she loses the entitlement.99  
Similarly, the former spouse of an insured person who is entitled to retirement 
benefits under the Social Security Act may be eligible for benefits as a divorced 
spouse (if they were married at least ten years).100  Nonetheless, upon her 
remarriage, a divorced spouse typically cannot collect benefits on her former 
spouse’s record.101  Correspondingly, if the insured ex-spouse is alive, remarriage of 
the uninsured at any age precludes eligibility for Social Security and Medicare.102  
Several recent studies confirm that eligibility for Social Security is decidedly 
influential in the decisions of divorced and widowed people regarding their 
living arrangements.103 
  
own systems that try to fix these problems.  Andrew Giambrone, Yale Resists Financial Aid Distortions, 
YALE DAILY NEWS (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2011/nov/04/yale-resists-
financial-aid-distortions. 
97. Kennedy & Fitch, supra note 40, at 1491. 
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2006) (awarding survivor’s benefits).  In order to be eligible, the spouses 
had to have been married for at least ten years.  42 U.S.C § 416(d)(2) (2006). 
99. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2006). 
100. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (2006) (divorced husband). 
101. 42 U.S.C.§ 402(b)(1)(C) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (2006) (divorced 
husband).  The divorced can regain eligibility if their most recent marriage ends either by death, 
divorce, or annulment.  See RS 00202.046 Entitlement of a Divorced Spouse After Termination of 
Subsequent Marriage - Policy, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/ 
0300202046 (last updated Feb. 12, 2013). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(H) (2006) (divorced wife); 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(H) (2006) 
(divorced husband); Hospital Insurance, http://treasury.tn.gov/oasi/PDFs/MEDICARE-
INFORMATION.pdf. 
103. See generally Gary V. Engelhardt, Social Security and Elderly Homeownership, 63 J. URBAN 
ECON. 280 (2008) (concluding that reductions in Social Security benefits would significantly 
alter the elderly homeownership rate, especially for widowed people); Gary V. Engelhardt, 
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C. Marriage Penalty 
Because of marital status alone, some married couples pay more income 
tax than they would if they were unmarried, while others pay less.  These policies 
are known respectively as the “marriage penalty” and the “marriage bonus.”  
Marriage penalties and bonuses result from tax code provisions that treat a 
married couple as one taxable unit and an unmarried couple as two taxable 
units.104  Because of this, sometimes—depending on a variety of such factors 
as the gap in income between the partners, the number of children, etc.—
nonmarital partners pay less income tax by virtue of their “single” or “head of 
household” filing status.105  Indeed, a body of research shows that “taxes have 
a small but statistically significant effect on the decision whether to marry.”106 
Inquiry into the complexities of the federal rate-tables and the various 
ways that partners could gain or lose as a result of their nonmarital status exceeds 
the scope of this Article.107  For the purposes of this Article, as a general prin-
ciple, if the spouses’ incomes are fairly similar, then their tax liability will be 
greater as joint filers than if they were not married and filed separately.108  In 
other words, the tax system penalizes mainly dual-earner couples whose in-
comes are somewhat equal.109  Generally speaking—except for the extreme 
case in which a couple obviously divorces to file taxes as separate individuals 
and then remarries—the state does not target people who strategically do not 
  
Jonathan Gruber & Cynthia D. Perry, Social Security and Elderly Living Arrangements, 40 J. 
HUM. RESOURCES 354 (2005). 
104. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (West 2011) (“A husband and wife may make a single return jointly of 
income taxes under subtitle A, even though one of the spouses has neither gross income nor 
deductions . . . .”); I.R.C. § 1 (West 2011) (creating four filing statuses: married filing jointly, 
married filing separately, single, or head of household).  The lack of marriage neutrality is 
also the result of progressive rather than proportional tax rates.  See Whittington & Alm, 
supra note 25, at 82–83. 
105. See HERTZ, supra note 52, at 117–26. 
106. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love (of Money) Have to Do 
With Joint Tax Filing?, 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 749 (2011). 
107. For a general list of possible tax advantages for unmarried couples, see Lauren J. Wolven, 
Estate Planning for Unmarried Adults, ST042 ALI-ABA 575 (2012). 
108. Abrams, supra note 20, at 15–16. 
109. Nevertheless, even low-earner couples can benefit from not being married.  A study based on 
data from the 2002 National Survey of America’s Families found that about half of 
unmarried cohabitants would have owed more taxes if they were married.  Gregory Acs & 
Elaine Maag, Irreconcilable Differences? The Conflict between Marriage Promotion Initiatives for 
Cohabiting Couples With Children and Marriage Penalties in Tax and Transfer Programs, NEW 
FEDERALISM: NAT’L SURVEY OF AM.’S FAMILIES 3 (Urban Inst. Ser. No. B-66, 2005).  
But the study predicted that, due to some changes in provisions such as the Earned Income 
Tax Credit, by 2008, the percentage of low-income taxpayers (unmarried couples with 
children) facing marriage tax penalties would fall to 10.5 percent.  Id. at 4. 
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get married or who strategically divorce just to avoid the tax penalty.110  Obviously, 
this description does not purport to find all the tax loopholes that unmarried 
couples can use—they are numerous, cannot easily be recognized, and change 
every year. 
* * * 
This short and nonexhaustive summary illustrates that family law must 
address the potential financial benefit that stems from being unrecognized, 
both because there are several areas in which this status is beneficial, and because 
there is significant evidence—anecdotal and otherwise—that many people are 
affected by these benefits.  The account also shows that, for the most part, 
vulnerable populations are those who benefit financially from nonrecognition: 
elderly, higher education students, and the poor.  But, as I show in Part II, the 
separation between poverty law and family law has rendered these segments 
of the population invisible to family law—the ways in which recognition of 
these relationships can harm people are given scant attention in the legal 
scholarship. 
II. THE TREND TOWARD RECOGNITION AND ITS EFFECT  
ON THE CURRENTLY UNRECOGNIZED 
Here, I give an account of the current legal landscape for nonmarital unions 
in the United States.  My primary aim is to explore the potential ramifications 
of legal recognition of currently unrecognized relationships, in particular for 
those populations discussed above. 
In order to understand both the existing law and policy that govern 
unmarried partners as well as proposals for legal reform, it is imperative first 
to comprehend the hurdles that nonrecognized partners face.  I start by 
providing a brief analysis of the legal issues associated with the proliferation 
of nonmarital arrangements in the United States.  Specifically, I break down 
the injuries from legal nonrecognition to the resultant economic and dignitary 
inequities.  Then, in Part II.B, I introduce the trend toward recognition by 
presenting both the existing legal terrain and major proposals for policy 
  
110. In response to a tax-motivated divorce, the sham-transaction doctrine could be applied so 
that the divorced couple would be deemed to have filed their taxes returns as “married.”  
Boyter v. Comm’r, 668 F.2d 1382 (4th Cir. 1981).  But since the sham-transaction doctrine 
is limited only to those who remarry after divorce, tax-motivated divorce is still an option for 
those who do not remarry, whether or not they continue to live together.  Abrams, supra note 
20, at 25–27; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-350-76 (June 1, 1978). 
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change.  In Part II.C, I consider the ways in which the trend toward recogni-
tion can harm those who currently enjoy financial benefits from non-
recognition. 
A. How Marriage Exceptionalism Results in Cultural  
and Economic Injustices 
Despite the prevalence of various family arrangements, the law does not 
provide unmarried partners the protections they need or an efficient supportive 
framework around which to organize the legal issues that stem from their re-
lationships.111  The difficulty is that the law of domestic relations is strongly 
focused on the married couple as the unit that deserves the law’s respect and 
protection, to the exclusion of others.  This is what can be called marriage 
exceptionalism.  The forfeit that is caused to families that fall outside the 
scope of the law can be significant.  During their relationship, unmarried 
partners are ineligible for hundreds of rights, benefits, and protections that 
are granted to married couples by the state (including the federal government) 
and by third parties.112  Examples include tax breaks and immigration benefits 
from the federal government, eligibility for health insurance, and sick days 
from employers.113  Upon the end of their relationships—either due to death 
or breakup—unmarried couples cannot claim exemptions from the estate tax 
nor claim intestate inheritance rights.114  Additionally, the law imposes default 
obligations on spouses vis-à-vis each other during and upon the end of the 
relationship, such as a duty of support (during the relationship) and division 
of property and alimony (at the end of the relationship).115  Similar obliga-
tions are not automatically prescribed for unmarried partners.116 
Deprived of state protection, people in nonmarital unions can suffer 
economic injustice and dignitary-cultural harm—two injuries that occa-
sionally intersect, though neither is merely an effect of the other.  The clas-
sic case often goes as follows: An unmarried, opposite-sex couple lived in a 
common residence, had children, and developed economic and emotional 
  
111. See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 587 (2013). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955–56 (Mass. 2003) (listing 
the protections and benefits that stem from marriage). 
115. Id. 
116. In Washington state, partners are presumed to have obligations toward one another in terms 
of property distribution.  See infra note 141 and accompanying text.   
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interdependency.117  Upon the end of the relationship, the woman partner 
(often) is left without rights in the once-shared property or rights to financial 
support because cohabitation does not automatically bring with it those legal 
obligations on the part of her partner.118  In such case, the economic injustice 
is quite clear.  The weaker party, who invested in domestic work and raised 
the children while providing the partner the opportunity to invest in his career, is 
left with few or no resources.119  The economic injustice in this case also reflects a 
devaluation of domestic work and child rearing, work which is traditionally 
done by women; the injustice is often further exacerbated by existing ine-
qualities in the employment market.120  The dignitary harm results from the 
fact that only marriage is respected and recognized as a relationship worthy of 
state protection.  Further, by not recognizing nonmarital relationships, the state 
devalues people’s autonomy to choose the family structure they want.  The 
state imposes a framework (marriage) that may be undesirable for some and 
stigmatizes nonmarital relationships by treating them as inferior.121  To illu-
minate, were the partners married, the economic and cultural harms would 
have been prevented, as the law imposes financial duties on the partners upon 
divorce (unless they have opted-out by signing prenuptial agreement), and 
the marital status is respected by the state.  
Similarly, nonrecognition of nonconjugal relationships could also generate 
economic injustice and dignitary-cultural harm.  I use the example of 
nonrecognition of friendships to illustrate.  By not recognizing friendships, 
the state withholds from friends a variety of economic benefits—for example, 
eligibility to inherit each other’s estates under state intestacy rules, and standing to 
sue for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by a friend’s death.122  
As for the dignitary aspect, the state creates a hierarchy of relationships that 
favors domestic caregiving and intimate relationships over others.  Such a system 
generates stigma and even loneliness for those who live in nonsanctioned 
relationships, eventually leading some people to feel that being unmarried is 
  
117. Cf. Alicia Brokars Kelly, Actualizing Intimate Partnership Theory, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 263 
(2012) (“The harms caused are especially acute for cohabitants, for women, and for same-sex 
couples.  Caregivers, who are usually women, tend to disproportionately bear earning power 
disadvantages produced by communal choices.”). 
118. This is, of course, provided that the couple did not sign a cohabitation agreement that secures 
these rights (and would be generally enforced in all but three states). 
119. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 155 (1993); cf. 
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 267–68 (2001). 
120. See, e.g., Alicia Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth 
Distribution at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 162 (2004). 
121. See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 119, at 93. 
122. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 204–05 (2007). 
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being a failure.123  Marriage exceptionalism also entrenches the symbolic 
harm of marriage and the harm of being single by signaling that the path to 
success necessarily follows marriage.124  Having more than one state-sanctioned 
relationship might eliminate some of this dignitary injury both by reducing 
the significance of any one type of relationship and by elevating the status of 
particular alternative relationships as well.125  This legal structure also adversely 
affects predominantly women because the state directs people to choose only 
one comprehensive domestic relationship, in which an extensive amount of 
domestic care is expected.  Since women are still more likely to be the main 
caregiver, this structure maintains traditional gender roles.126 
Responding to the growing number of nonmarital arrangements and the 
harm caused by their legal maltreatment, scholars, courts, and policy makers 
have long contemplated the proper policy approach.  The following Subpart 
surveys a few of them and analyzes the different, sometimes contradictory, le-
gal doctrines, proposals, and theories. 
B. The Trend Toward Legal Recognition  
In this Subpart, I sketch the complicated terrain of legal recognition of 
nonmarital unions in the United States.127  My aim is to establish that legal 
recognition of nonnuclear families is on the rise.  At the same time, I indicate 
how in practice, legal recognition of nonmarital unions is quite limited. 
  
123. Cf. Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689 (2008) 
(“The normative centrality and, indeed, priority of the institution of marriage establishes 
the standard by which all other forms of kinship, family, friendship, temporary alliance, 
and love are both rendered legible and assigned value.  In this, and in most societies, 
marriage is the measure of all things.  Thus, affective associations that lie outside the 
formal paling of marriage are evaluated and understood by virtue of their likeness to, or dissimilarity 
from, marriage.”). 
124. See, e.g., JOHN SCANZONI ET AL., THE SEXUAL BOND: RETHINKING FAMILIES AND 
CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 72 (1989); Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 217, 228.  
125. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 228 (“Explicit legal recognition of friendship could soften the 
effects of the state’s current, implicit regulation of friendship by signaling that friendship is 
worthy of state support.  Such signaling might eliminate some of the stigma experienced by 
people living outside of state-sanctioned coupling, because other personal relationships would 
be recognized by the state.”). 
126. See id. at 191. 
127. It is a complicated terrain for two reasons.  First, it includes different players who are pushing 
in different directions: courts, scholars, policy makers, and the affected people themselves.  
Second, often the doctrine itself does not adequately describe the reality; for example, the im-
plied contract doctrine that is supposed to “protect” cohabitants in reality provides very little 
protection. 
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Acknowledging the harm to unmarried families caused by marriage 
exceptionalism, legal scholars have offered a variety of proposals to reduce it.  
With strikingly few exceptions,128 the remedy to this injustice is pinned to le-
gal recognition of relationships.129  More recognition includes more types of 
familial relationships—such as friendships,130 relatives,131 cohabiting conjugal 
couples,132 caregiving relations,133 and nonmonogamous relationships134—and 
more types of legal institutions.  In the following, I discuss a select, 
nonexhaustive list of suggested and existing policies that are indicative of the 
general trend.135 
In the zone of cohabiting couples, at least on the surface, there is an increasing 
recognition and enforcement of obligations between intimate unmarried couples.  
Following a ruling of the California Supreme Court in 1977 in the case of 
Marvin v. Marvin,136 most states enforce contractual financial obligations between 
  
128. See Franke, supra note 123, at 2703 (“Some of the recent scholarship urging the legal 
regulation of friendship strikes me as radically wrongheaded.  Unfortunately, this work 
indulges the misplaced view that, if something important is at stake, law should regulate it.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Abrams, supra note 20, at 6 (“[W]e should isolate and 
disaggregate the various state interests in marriage and then reconfigure marriage to retain 
those features relevant to salient interests and to discard those relating to interests that would 
be better dealt with elsewhere.”); Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and 
Countermarriage, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 235, 263–66 (2011) (imagining a world in which the 
state refuses to enforce contracts between romantic partners, and, while arguing that such 
regime is very unlikely, providing some reasonable justifications for such policy). 
129. Elsewhere, I divided the proposals into four groups: traditionalism, which advocates 
maintaining marriage’s special status because it is the best framework to organize and 
privatize support between family members; abolitionism, which urges the abolition of 
marriage and a shift to a contractual regime; functionalism, which promotes legal recognition 
of relationships according to the family’s function rather than its status; and a menu-of-
options approach, which supports the creation of a plurality of state-sanctioned institutions 
for recognition of relationships.  See Aloni, supra note 111, at 594–606. 
130. See infra notes 154–156, 158 and accompanying text (discussing a few proposals for inclusion 
of friendships in family law). 
131. See infra notes 164, 274, 305 and accompanying text (discussing Nancy Polikoff’s proposal). 
132. See infra notes 146–147, 149, 175–176 and accompanying text (discussing Cynthia Bowman’s 
proposal and ALI proposal). 
133. See infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing Martha Fineman’s approach). 
134. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for 
Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010) (advocating for recognition of polygamy to the 
extent that it is effectively regulated). 
135. Because “[s]cholarly literature over the last several decades has been flooded” with theories to 
legally recognize nonmarital unions, I will have to limit the discussion to a small number of 
major theories, while neglecting many of them.  Alicia Brokars Kelly, Explaining Intuitions: 
Relating Mergers, Contribution, and Loss in the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 
8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 185, 186 (2001). 
136. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding that contractual obligations 
between unmarried partners are enforceable in California).  Marvin also specifically approved 
the use of equitable remedies when warranted by the circumstances presented by the case.  
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unmarried couples upon dissolution of the relationship.137  In reality, however, a 
Marvin-type remedy provides very little protection to unmarried couples because 
some courts enforce only written contracts or demand clear and convincing 
evidence in order to find obligations between the partners.138  Courts also 
tend to ascribe obligations mostly in cases in which there was explicit finan-
cial contribution by the claimant (for example, if the party invested some 
amount in the property or in other mutual expenses).139 
In addition, but more rarely, status-based recognition is also sometimes 
available for cohabitants.  At least one state (Washington) offers more robust 
protection to unmarried couples because the court holds just division of prop-
erty as a rebuttable presumption if the cohabitants at stake behaved in a married-
like fashion.140  In 2002, the American Law Institute (ALI) suggested a 
somewhat similar model.141  According to the ALI’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, couples who either maintain a common household for a 
state-defined period or raise a child together will be presumed “domestic 
partners.”142  Domestic partners are then treated as married in terms of 
  
Id.; see also BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 38–45 (surveying equitable remedies for unmarried 
couples and criticizing their inadequacy). 
137. Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1383 (2001) 
(“[M]ost states’ courts routinely enforce express agreements and recognize various equitable 
claims between unmarried partners, particularly where they share a business or property.”).  
Only four states (Illinois, Mississippi, Georgia, and Louisiana) do not enforce contracts 
between nonmarital couples at all.  See Aloni, supra note 111, at 587. 
138. See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 50–52; HERTZ, supra note 52, at 12–14. 
139. See Estin, supra note 137, at 1384. 
140. See, e.g., Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 350 (Wash. 2007) (establishing the term “law of 
committed intimate relationships”); Vasquez v. Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 739 (Wash. 2001) 
(Sanders J., concurring) (“Relevant factors establishing a meretricious relationship include, 
but are not limited to: continuous cohabitation, duration of the relationship, purpose of the 
relationship, pooling of resources and services for joint projects, and the intent of the 
parties.”); HERTZ, supra note 52, at 13–14. 
141. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).  Elizabeth Scott offered a more moderate approach.  
According to her proposal, cohabiting couples who share a child or live together for five years 
would assume financial marital-like obligations upon separation unless they opt out.  See 
Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott, Legal Regulation of Twenty-First-Century Families, in 
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 14, at 303, 317. 
142. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 141, § 6.03.  While the ALI principles leave it to the 
legislature to decide what the required cohabitation period is, the principles seem to 
recommend, based on other countries’ experiences, that the cohabitation period for couples 
with a common child will be two years and for couples without a common child, three years.  
See id. § 6.03 cmt. d.  The principles also add factors that can rebut the presumption created 
by the length of cohabitation.  The same factors can be used to establish the presumption in 
cases in which the cohabitation time was shorter than required by the statute. 
Deprivative Recognition 1305 
 
maintenance and distribution of property upon separation.143  Couples who 
want to opt out of this default need a prior written agreement.  This proposal, 
however, has not been adopted by any state,144 and has been widely criticized 
for being too inclusive because it may impose marital obligations on people 
who may be uninterested in taking on such obligations.145 
In any event, even under the ALI proposal, unmarried partners are still 
deprived of a variety of rights and benefits that are provided by the state and 
third parties to married partners during their relationships.  Thus, Cynthia 
Bowman suggests that relationships of unmarried opposite-sex couples who 
share the same residence (for more than two years) or have a common child 
(regardless of the time they share a residence) should be recognized by the 
state and third parties as “quasi-married.”146  That means that the couple’s ob-
ligations toward each other would be similar to those of married couples, and 
the state and third parties would treat the couple as married for all purposes.147 
While this proposal is considered by some to be improbable as a candi-
date for adoption,148 the states that recognize common law marriage—a minority 
of states—already do deem some couples as married for all purposes even if 
they have not formally entered into marriage.  This is, of course, a very different 
landscape because, contrary to Bowman’s proposal, couples need to hold 
themselves out as married in order to be recognized as such—a much more 
demanding requirement than merely two years of sharing a residence.149  Despite 
the national trend to repeal common law marriage, Utah recently enacted 
common law marriage.150  The reason for such enactment was to prevent 
polygamists from using the welfare system in a “fraudulent manner.”151  The 
  
143. See id. § 6.0. 
144. See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 3. 
145. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for 
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 250, 262–63 (2004); Franke, supra note 123, at 
2697 (“Thus, the law opts them into a marriage-like regime whether or not they reached a 
mutual explicit agreement that they desired or intended to acquire this status. . . . The 
intended effect of the ALI Principles is to enlarge marriage law’s shadow.”).  The ALI 
proposal has also been criticized by conservative commentators because they view it as 
weakening the marriage institution. 
146. BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 221–24. 
147. See id. 
148. Cf. Aloni, supra note 111, at 603–06 (criticizing Bowman’s proposal because it is, in essence, 
another path into marriage). 
149. BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 5–6 (contending that common law marriage is an inadequate 
remedy for the treatment of unmarried couples because even married people today do not 
necessarily present themselves as husband and wife, but rather as partners). 
150. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 (2007). 
151. See Abrams, supra note 20, at 29. 
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concern was that in a polygamist’s household, in which the man officially is 
married only to one woman but in practice cohabits with more, the unmarried 
women would receive welfare benefits as if they were single.152 
As stated before, legal recognition claims are not limited to intimate 
partnerships.  Surprisingly, even though family law has only recently concerned 
itself with the issue of friendships, it appears that this subject has already 
gained popularity in scholarship (as evidenced by the number of articles that 
discuss it).153  Commentators who ask for legal regulation of friendships take 
different stands in terms of the type of legal recognition they suggest.  David 
Chambers advocates the creation of a “designated friends” registry that would 
offer friends a limited number of privileges and responsibilities relating to the 
care of each other.154  Laura Rosenbury “calls for explicit state recognition of 
friendship” based on the “principles of nonexclusivity and fluidity.”155  Her 
general approach would have the state provide an individual the opportunity 
to designate more than one person for state protections and benefits.  She re-
jects, however, a friendship registry as the sole solution, and even rejects a dual 
registry (one that would allow designation of both a best friend and an inti-
mate partner) because they require people to choose only one friend and 
would privilege one type of relationship over others.  More theoretically, 
Katherine Franke suggests that because friendship can take many shapes, is 
very flexible, and “occupies a social space largely unregulated by law,” friendship 
(rather than marriage) can serve as a paradigm for “our reasoning about sexual 
and affective liberty.”156  Ethan Leib, on the other hand, proposes lighter reg-
ulation of friendships.157  In short, he proposes that friends should be able to 
take medical leave to help sick friends, have standing to sue for wrongful 
death, be eligible for tax deductions for their care of friends, and be treated as 
holding fiduciary duties in cases of economic transition between friends.158 
While the recognition of nonintimate partners in the manner that is 
proposed by these scholars seems far away, a few states have started to recognize 
nonintimate unions for particular purposes.  Recently, for instance, California 
  
152. See id. 
153. See infra notes 154–158 and accompanying text. 
154. See David L. Chambers, For the Best of Friends and for Lovers of All Sorts, a Status Other Than 
Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1353–55 (2001); see also Aloni, supra note 111, at 
607–13 (suggesting a relationship registration scheme that would also be open to friends). 
155. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 229. 
156. Franke, supra note 123, at 2702–03. 
157. ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND 
WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 78–107 (2011). 
158. Id. 
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passed a law that exempts unmarried partners who co-own property in joint 
tenancy from reassessment of property tax when their property changes hands 
after the death of a partner.159  According to its terms, this law could be applied to 
nonintimate couples who share a residence.  Other states and federal programs 
have also changed their rules so that benefits are available to nonconjugal 
partners.160  In addition, two states, Hawaii and Vermont, provide a registration 
scheme for nonconjugal partners that confers a limited panoply of rights and 
benefits.  In Hawaii, the registration is open to everyone who is prohibited 
from marriage (same-sex couples and nonintimate partners, including friends 
and relatives),161 but in Vermont the registration is open only to people with 
familial relationships.162  These two legal institutions have not proven widely 
popular and very few nonintimate partners have registered.163 
Two other prominent models that shift the focus from marriage to the 
functional family are those posited by Nancy Polikoff and Martha Fineman.  
In the shortest version, Polikoff’s account calls for valuing all families.  She 
asks that families be recognized by their function rather than by marriage or 
by any status.  Her three key principles are: preferring the needs of children 
and their caretakers over other adult relationships, supporting the children’s 
needs in all types of families, and acknowledging adult interdependency.164  
Fineman asserts that protections and support should essentially be directed to 
vertical (intergenerational) caregiving relationships rather than to traditional 
horizontal relationships between adults (spouses).165 
Finally, another influential approach in the trend toward recognition is 
the pluralistic policy, also known as the menu-of-options proposal.166  Proponents 
of this approach advocate the creation of a variety of state-supported legal 
mechanisms for recognition of different types of relationships.167  Shahar 
Lifshitz, for instance, proposes a pluralist theory that emphasizes the state’s 
  
159. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 62.5 (West 2012). 
160. For example, until 2006, an inherited pension could be exempted from tax if the spouse rolled 
the fund into her own retirement account.  In 2006, the U.S. Congress passed a bill that allows 
any beneficiary to move the fund without paying tax.  See POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 191. 
161. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 572C-1 et seq. (2011). 
162. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1303 (2011). 
163. Aloni, supra note 111, at 592–93 (“These statutes are thus very limited in their scope and do 
not provide alternatives for opposite-sex couples in conjugal relationships, nor, in Vermont, 
do they provide such alternatives for non-intimate partners.  It is no wonder, then, that the 
number of registrations is extremely small.”). 
164. See POLIKOFF supra note 48, at 137–38. 
165. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 6–8 (1995). 
166. Id. at 599–601 (explaining the pluralistic approach and criticizing it for lack of coherence). 
167. See Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772 (2005). 
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obligation to create a range of legal institutions that offer meaningful choices 
to individuals in organizing their relationships.168  In particular, he asserts 
that such an approach needs to attach different consequences to marriage 
than to nonmarital unions.  In fact, a feeble menu of options has already 
emerged in some places: Civil unions and other somewhat similar legal insti-
tutions—some of them also open to opposite-sex couples—already exist in 
several states.169  But like the previously discussed registration schemes in 
Hawaii and Vermont, the existing legal institutions have not as of yet been 
endorsed by the public.170 
In sum, the movements back and forth toward recognition and away 
from recognition still comprise a very lively and developing area of the law.  
Legal scholarship has generally been supportive of the expansion of recogni-
tion to include more family structures.171  Courts, at least when it comes to the 
recognition of nonmarital unions, have been more reluctant to afford protections 
to unmarried couples.  Legislatures are moving between more recognition 
and restricting recognition.  As acknowledged by Eskridge, “[f]or most states, 
the menu of relationship regimes has developed haphazardly and without a 
systematic public debate about the effects of the menu.”172  Notwithstanding 
the various directions supported by different state and private agents, the enterprise 
of expanding recognition is already a fact.173  Development is proceeding in a 
strong overall direction—toward more recognition. 
Almost completely ignored by the celebration of recognition is the range 
of arenas in which people can benefit financially from nonrecognition.  The 
  
168. See Lifshitz, supra note 16.  William N. Eskridge proposes that some menus of options 
already exist for the U.S. family because most states offer ex-post recognition of cohabiting 
couples and some offer civil unions or additional state-sanctioned legal institutions.  See 
William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of Menus, Default 
Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881 (2012). 
169. See Aloni, supra note 111, 591–94 (surveying the different registration schemes that exist). 
170. See id. at 592–93.  One of the reasons that these legal institutions have not shown success is 
that they were created as compromises to block or delay the legalization of same-sex marriage.  As 
such, they are perceived as inferior to marriage; and, commonly, when same-sex marriage is 
legalized, these institutions are abolished.  Notwithstanding this pessimistic description, I 
have elsewhere argued that these institutions have a potential to develop into meaningful 
marriage alternatives.  Id. at 627–28. 
171. The main exception to the trend toward more recognition is traditionalists’ opposition to the 
expansion of legal recognition of nonmarital families.  Traditionalists argue that marriage is 
the best framework for raising children and should be treated differently from other family 
structures.  See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalence, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 999 (2009). 
172. Eskridge, supra note 168, at 1891. 
173. Id. at 1889. 
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following Subpart asks how the existence of this significant phenomenon pertains 
to the trend toward recognition. 
C. Recognizing Nonrecognition 
Legal scholarship has failed to engage with the question of how increas-
ing legal recognition might affect the lives of those who gain financially from 
nonrecognition.  On the most basic level, this shortcoming is expressed by legal 
scholars’ widespread failure to even consider this phenomenon and the way it 
may affect their theories.  Perhaps this neglect is correlated to family law’s 
separation from poverty law and the former’s tendency to address the entrance to 
and exit from relationships to the exclusion of addressing ongoing family 
life.174  This Subpart begins filling in this serious gap in the scholarship. 
Bowman’s proposal to recognize all cohabiting couples as quasi-married 
after two years of cohabitation or having a child is an example of a theory 
more focused on subjects that traditionally have been considered part of family 
law—here, the vulnerability of women upon the ending of relationships—
rather than on those that have been excluded by family law, such as poor 
families.175  (The proposal is similar in its effect to Utah’s recognition of 
common law marriage, which, as stated above, meant specifically to prevent 
use of the welfare system.)  Bowman briefly discusses the possibility that under her 
proposed regime some people will lose assistance from states’ social welfare 
programs.  She does not consider, however, other types of forfeits under her 
regime, such as the loss of post-marital benefits (survivor’s benefits) or financial 
aid.176  With regard to the potential loss of welfare grants, Bowman contends 
that in cases in which the cohabiting man is working, the fact that these couples 
will be treated as married for all other purposes compensates for the possible 
ending of welfare for them—for example, by extension of employer-based 
health insurance.177  Otherwise, she adds, a study found that unmarried women 
from poor backgrounds are aware of the risks of living with unproductive men 
  
174. See Halley & Rittich, supra note 26, at 764. 
175. See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 244 (concluding that when she envisions remedies for the 
legal treatment of cohabitants, she has in mind a woman who tries to leave her abusive 
husband, and explains how her remedy is suitable to handle such a case). 
176. Id. at 240–41.  In a footnote, and without further discussion, Bowman refers to an article that 
suggests the option of creating a “statewide civil union” as a solution to the problems 
associated with elderly who could lose their post-marital entitlements and benefits.  See John 
R. Schleppenbach, Strange Bedfellows: Why Older Straight Couples Should Advocate for the 
Passage of the Illinois Civil Union Act, 17 ELDER L.J. 31, 51–53 (2009). 
177. BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 240–41. 
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and are determined to protect themselves;178 further, Bowman states that the 
division of property at the end of the relationships will protect the women.   
Bowman’s argument, however, is not entirely convincing because cohab-
itation is very common among low-income groups.  Low-income partners 
would be unlikely to enjoy the benefits of property distribution or estate tax 
exemptions (people at the poverty level typically do not own significant property) 
or the extension of health insurance (if they are unemployed, or if their 
employer does not provide health insurance).179  In many instances the couple 
would be better off with access to Medicaid, SSI, food stamps, housing, welfare, 
and the like.180 
Less inclusive proposals—those that impose obligations only at the end 
of nonmarital relationships—could also, in time, be harmful to couples who 
gain financially from nonrecognition.  This is because such proposals do not 
contemplate whether ascribing obligations between the partners would 
someday result in more state control over the partners, especially regarding 
more vulnerable populations.  That is, when the state ascribes obligations between 
the partners, it could (at least theoretically) enforce obligations for other matters, 
such as support during the relationship (and thus reduce or eliminate eligibil-
ity for means-tested programs). 
To illustrate, consider Lifshitz’s pluralistic approach and the ALI recom-
mendations.  According to Lifshitz, the state should treat cohabitation and 
marriage as completely distinct legal institutions; and, within cohabitations, 
different legal consequences should be applied to “regular cohabitation” 
(short-term cohabitation) and “relational cohabitation” (longer-term cohabi-
tation).181  Such an approach does not provide answers to a few fundamental 
questions concerning the duties that result from recognition.182  In particular, 
  
178. Id. at 240 (referring to KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: 
WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005)). 
179. Even under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, employers who have fewer than 
fifty employees do not have to insure their employees. 
180. The concern is that as a result of calculating in the income of the man—who may not even 
contribute to the household—eligibility would be jeopardized or benefit levels reduced.  If 
the affected women want to protect themselves from this consequence, according to 
Bowman’s suggestion they could either avoid living with these men—which may not be what 
they want—or register as domestic partners—something that is unlikely that they would do, 
and that could also have other ramifications, as I explain below.  Id. 
181. Lifshitz, supra note 16, at 1604–07. 
182. For example, should the fact that one of the partners gains economically from nonrecognition 
affect their mutual obligations at the end of the relationship?  Similarly, Lifshitz’s theory 
gives heavy weight to the types of relationships and to the way that the type of relationship 
matters for purposes of determining the legal consequences of the dissolution.  Maybe, then, 
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the scheme does not indicate what exactly the relationship between the couple and 
third parties, including the state, should be.  This is problematic because if 
the state mandates that some relationships carry the legal consequence of 
equal division of property at the end of the relationships, it may create a property 
right on behalf of both partners even before the separation.  (For example, in 
a common law state, a presumption of tenancy by the entirety could be estab-
lished, if parties meet the criteria that establish a status or presumption.)  It 
thus makes sense that the state would recognize these mutual obligations vis-à-vis 
other duties, such as mutual responsibility for Medicaid eligibility.  If married 
couples need to spend-down their assets when partners apply for Medicaid, 
there are no compelling reasons for the state to treat differently cohabitants 
who have legal obligations toward each other.183  This is even more apparent 
with regard to the ALI proposal, which creates a couple’s status after a few 
years of their living together.  If a domestic partnership status is established 
after a specific time, then when one individual applies for welfare and lives 
with another person longer than the term that establishes the partners’ status—a 
status that raises a presumption of mutual obligations—then it makes some 
sense to treat these partners as one unit in a way that could reduce eligibility 
for means-tested programs.184 
  
economic gain as a motivation changes couples’ classification; for example, from “regular 
cohabitants” to “relational cohabitants.” 
183. The difference between the two situations is that marriage is a clearly registered status, while 
in Lifshitz’s proposal the status could be established only upon the dissolution of the bond. 
184. An additional problem in the menu-of-options approach is the assumption that state registrations 
(for domestic partnership or civil unions) would likely not be recognized by the federal government, 
including for purposes of eliminating benefits.  A common suggestion in legal scholarship is that 
state registration is the solution for the elderly.  See Barry Kozak, Civil Unions in Illinois: Issues That 
Illinois Attorneys Should Consider, 25 CBA Rec. 30, 34 (2011). 
  Indeed, three states (Washington, California, and New Jersey) open their registration to 
couples who are over sixty-two, for the same reason.  See HERTZ, supra note 52, at 209 n.3.  
The rationale behind this policy is that the elderly would want to have a way to arrange their 
mutual lives (having medical decisionmaking privileges, for example) but without risking 
their eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid. 
  But it is far from clear that the federal government will ignore registered unions of the 
elderly for purposes of calculating benefits and eligibility.  As we have seen, in Medicaid, the 
state deems couples who hold themselves out as married as, indeed, married, and there is no 
better sign of being a couple than being registered as a couple.  Moreover, due to a recent 
decision of the IRS to treat opposite-sex couples under civil unions in Illinois as married for 
the purpose of filing joint tax returns, it is really an unresolved question if the current 
situation (in which the federal government does not withhold benefits based on state 
registration) will continue.  Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, 
Internal Revenue Serv., to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://law.scu.edu/blog/samesextax/file/IRS%20Civil%C20Union%20letter.pdf.  Similarly, 
there is no reason to believe that low-income and poor people will register if there is a risk 
1312 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276 (2014) 
 
The assumption that the adoption of the above-mentioned proposals 
will harm more vulnerable populations and will be used by the state to further 
privatize mutual support between unmarried couples is not without empirical 
support.  Rather, the experience of other countries that have adopted progressive 
policies that recognize unmarried couples teach that legal recognition is for 
better and for worse. 
In Australia, for example, partners (opposite- or same-sex) who live together, 
are over the age of consent, and are not in a prohibited relationship are recognized 
as “de facto partners.”185  The criteria for “de facto relationships” include the 
time the partners lived together, their reputation, and financial interdependency.186  
Recognition as de facto partners provides a handful of important rights and 
benefits but also considerable obligations, including possible reductions in social 
welfare grants.  Acquiring “de facto partners” status is not based merely on the 
partners’ definitions of their relationships; rather, recognition can be involun-
tary, based on the decision of the Australian Department of Human Services.187  
That is, even “[i]f people do not tell Centrelink [a division of Australian’s 
Social Security] about their circumstances, it is possible that Centrelink may 
investigate and find that there is a relationship and then raise a debt against 
the persons involved and possibly prosecute them.”188  If a couple falls under 
the definition of de facto partners, the partners’ incomes and assets will be 
calculated together for eligibility for welfare, which might result in the reduc-
tion of welfare grants or even the elimination of grants that are restricted to 
singles (such as welfare grants to single parents). 
In what sounds like a relevant warning to the U.S., a booklet provided by 
the (Australian) National Welfare Rights Network and the Illawarra Legal 
Centre explains that “[t]he laws have changed to eliminate discrimination 
  
that their SSI or Medicaid eligibility will be revoked.  More generally, status change has 
consequences, even under state laws, that needs to be taken into account. 
  For instance, state law creates obligations between the partners, such as joint liability for 
debt, which can cause some people not to register.  Or even more relevant, as I explain in Part 
III, in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) it is the state that defines the 
assistance unit.  Therefore, for some people, it is uncertain that registration schemes would 
have a positive effect. 
185. Australian Government, Guide to Social Security Law, Section 2.2.5.10 Determining a De Facto 
Relationship, http://guidesacts.fahcsia.gov.au/guides_acts/ssg/ssguide-2/ssguide-2.2/ssguide-
2.2.5/ssguide-2.2.5.10.html (last updated May 3, 2010). 
186. See POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 116–17. 
187. It is different from deprivative recognition, because partners in de facto relationships are 
recognized for benefits and responsibilities, rather than only for responsibilities like in 
deprivative recognition. 
188. NAT’L WELFARE RIGHTS NETWORK & ILLAWARRA LEGAL CENTRE, RELATIONSHIPS 
AND CENTRELINK: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 5 (2009). 
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towards same sex couples; however the impact in the area of Social Security is 
causing problems for many couples who do not want to be public about their 
relationships.”189 
The Australian experience thus should serve as a caution to the legal 
scholarship that advocates the adoption of progressive and functional policies 
for recognition of nonmarital unions.  In fact, in the United States, partners 
are already recognized against their will—solely for the withholding of 
grants—even without the accompanying progressive policy of recognizing 
unmarried partners for purposes of benefits.  Part III explores those cases. 
III. PIERCING THE VEIL OF NONRECOGNITION 
The inadequate engagement of legal scholarship with the duties that are 
attached to legal recognition results in part from an incomplete understand-
ing of ascriptive recognition.  In this Part, I first parse out the different types 
of ascriptive recognition.  In particular, I distinguish between purely ascriptive 
recognition and partially ascriptive recognition.  Partially ascriptive recognition 
is a phenomenon that is already recognized in the scholarship—but is referred 
to simply as ascriptive—in which the state ascribes marital-like obligations to 
couples at the end of relationships, upon the request of one of the partners.190  
I argue that the cases in which a partner petitions for economic rights as 
against the other partner upon separation should be treated as partially 
ascriptive—legal recognition in those cases simply results from the request of 
one of the parties.  In other words, the state merely takes one side as a re-
sponse to a dispute between the parties.  Conversely, I discuss purely 
ascriptive recognition: cases in which the state recognizes partners without a 
request by either party. 
Importantly, purely ascriptive recognition does not have to be 
deprivative.  In the future, it is plausible that the state would decide to define 
a family unit without the partners’ request, but in a way that would not result 
in deprivation.  For example, under Bowman’s plan, some people who would 
be recognized by the state incur benefits and duties at the same time.  Such 
  
189. Id. 
190. Marsha Garrison calls the mechanism of providing ex-post marital-like obligations on 
couples upon separation “conscriptive” rather than “ascriptive” in order “to emphasize the fact 
that the obligations imposed by laws of this type are both compulsory and involuntary.”  
Garrison, supra note 41, at 324 n.88.  But whether you call this legal fiction conscriptive or 
ascriptive, the economic rights in these cases are being requested by one of the partners, 
unlike the cases I discuss in which the recognition is conferred by the state when neither party 
is interested in having that status. 
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policy, for some people, will not be deprivative—the involuntary recognition 
will not result in economic maldistribution.  Similarly, the Australian approach de-
scribed above (recognizing partners against their will for terminating benefits 
that stem from nonrecognition) is not necessarily deprivative, because the parties 
can be recognized for purposes of protections and benefits as well.  This Part, 
however, focuses exclusively on one subcategory of purely ascriptive recogni-
tion: deprivative recognition—the only existing policy that defines partners as 
a unit against the will of both parties and results in deprivation. 
And among deprivative recognition policies, we can distinguish two 
kinds.  The first is the traditional policy of deprivative recognition—in which 
the state merely recognizes the partners for the purpose of taking away a 
benefit but has no interest in the cultural recognition of the partners.  The 
best examples of such policy are the termination of alimony and welfare.  In 
the second category, unintended deprivative recognition policies, the state has 
some interest in the cultural recognition of the partners, but by recognizing 
the partners it creates an economic injustice.  Below, I start with defining and 
exploring traditional deprivation, then discuss unintended deprivation. 
A. Exploring Traditional Deprivative Recognition 
The state regularly allows people to enjoy the economic gain that stems 
from the nonrecognition of their relationships (or tries to prevent it only in 
rare and extreme cases).  Part I provided examples—in the context of SSI and 
the marriage penalty—in which the state infrequently tries to recognize 
unmarried couples against their will in order to withhold or terminate a bene-
fit that stems from nonrecognition.191  The same is true about post-marital enti-
tlements and benefits—those are terminated upon remarriage, but not upon 
cohabitation.  Nonetheless, in other particular contexts—social welfare and 
alimony—some states have developed more aggressive tools to pierce the veil 
of nonrecognition and to eliminate the gains that stem from it.  This is traditional 
deprivative recognition. 
I call this regulatory mechanism deprivative recognition because the 
recognition is against the partners’ will and deprives them of essential resources.  
  
191. As another example, an unmarried partner can be considered an “insider” in bankruptcy 
proceedings for the purpose of avoiding alleged preference.  See In re Levy, 185 B.R. 378 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995).  Ironically, unmarried couples who resemble married couples may 
not file a joint case, regardless of whether the debtors have incurred joint debts or have 
obtained joint assets.  See In re Malone, 50 B.R. 2 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Clem, 29 
B.R. 3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1982); In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). 
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Deprivative recognition can be initiated by third parties or by the state, but it 
is always the state that ultimately pierces the veil of nonrecognition.  
Deprivative recognition results in a financial loss to at least one member of 
the newly recognized partners. 
Importantly, in deprivative recognition, it is not the financial change 
(that may result from having a partner) that induces the recognition; rather, it 
is a change in family status.192  The state has different ways to calculate funding 
from external sources (for example, in the welfare area, income from any ex-
ternal source is calculated as an in-kind contribution or unearned income and 
will be dealt with according to the regular rules).  But in deprivative recogni-
tion it is the partnership that is recognized, rather than merely the financial change 
that it may cause. 
Traditional deprivative recognition is probably the oldest mechanism for 
legal recognition of people in nonmarital unions.  While partially ascriptive 
recognition was first established in 1977 (that is, ascribing ex-post marital-
like obligations on a couple vis-à-vis each other upon the request of one of the 
partners), the first statute that created deprivative recognition dates to 
1934.193  Significantly, deprivative recognition is markedly different than 
common law marriage because, in the latter, the couple is recognized as married for 
all purposes—with all the obligations and benefits.194  In deprivative recogni-
tion, on the other hand, the partners are recognized ad hoc, for an immediate 
purpose only.  Below, I examine the two most established and common cases 
of traditional deprivative recognition: termination of spousal support and 
termination or reduction of social welfare benefits. 
1. The Cohabitation-Termination Rule 
This Subpart focuses on the cohabitation-termination doctrine: the rule 
that spousal support is terminated, modified, or suspended upon a recipient’s 
cohabitation, sometimes only with a person of the opposite sex,195 and occa-
sionally even without the need to prove that the new relationship creates economic 
  
192. The termination of the benefit or entitlement, in some cases, as I explain below, could be 
rebutted by a show of no financial change, but first and foremost it is family status that 
matters. 
193. J. Thomas Oldham, Cohabitation by an Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J. FAM. L. 615, 621 (1982). 
194. Abrams, supra note 20, at 27. 
195. Absurdly, if an ex-partner cohabits with a person of the same sex, in some states this 
relationship will not bring the termination of the benefits.  See Jill Bornstein, At a Cross-Road: 
Anti-Same-Sex Marriage Policies and Principles of Equity: The Effect of Same-Sex Cohabitation 
on Alimony Payments to an Ex-Spouse, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1027 (2010) (analyzing some 
cases that held post-marital cohabitation with same-sex partner will not affect alimony). 
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interdependency between the cohabitants or financial change in the lives of 
the alimony recipient. 
The legal rule of cohabitation-termination originates from the long-
standing principle that remarriage of alimony recipients triggers termination 
of spousal support, or is a prima facie case for such termination.196  The ra-
tionale behind this principle is that alimony is the continuation of the duty of 
support imposed by marriage.197  Accordingly, when a new husband marries the 
maintenance recipient, he assumes the duty to support her.198  Termination 
thus prevents the “double support” that would otherwise be provided by the 
two spouses (the “ex” and the current).199 
Seemingly, the cohabitation-termination rule applies a similar rationale 
to that of terminating alimony upon remarriage.  Accordingly, if a spousal-
support recipient is now cohabiting with a new partner, the ex-partner should 
not continue to support the recipient.  The duty of support should now transfer to 
the new partner.  Further, the alimony recipient’s financial condition may 
have changed and the recipient may no longer be in need of spousal support.200  
Moreover, some contend that the policy of terminating alimony only upon 
remarriage, but not upon cohabitation, discourages people from remarry-
ing—and marriage is an important state interest.201  Others suggest that it is 
  
196. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, One More Time: Alimony, Intuition, and the Remarriage-Termination 
Rule, 81 IND. L.J. 971, 973 (2006). 
197. LESLIE JOAN HARRIS, JUNE CARBONE & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 521 (4th 
ed. 2010). 
198. Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 25–26 (2003). 
199. Lois Ullman, Alimony Modification: Cohabitation of Ex-Wife With Another Man, 7 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 471, 480 (1979) (describing court cases that justify the remarriage-termination rule 
as preventing double support).  A different view is that alimony in the no-fault era is based 
upon the woman’s need for support after divorce.  Accordingly, if the woman remarries, her 
need is assumed to have changed, and, as a result, alimony should be terminated.  Starnes, 
supra note 196, at 987–91.  This rationale does not justify the automatic termination of 
alimony because not every marriage changes the woman’s need.  See id. at 990 (“Even if a 
need-based model could convincingly explain alimony, it cannot explain the remarriage-
termination rule.”).  Some scholars view alimony as an entailment, a result of the partner’s 
contribution to the household and to the family’s financial growth, which entitles the 
recipient to an equitable share upon divorce.  Additional justification for alimony, which is 
designated by one scholar as a “postmodern” approach, views alimony as an entitlement—the 
recipient is entitled to compensation for time served and investments made, such as in raising 
the children, etc.  But if alimony is an entitlement, why should it be terminated upon 
remarriage or cohabitation?  See, e.g., id. at 991–94 (defining “postmodern alimony rationales” 
and claiming that they cannot explain the remarriage-termination rules). 
200. See HOMER H. CLARK JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 463 (1968). 
201. See, e.g., Oldham, supra note 193, at 638. 
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immoral to allow the maintenance recipient to spend her ex-spouse’s money 
on her new partner.202  Another justification is that cohabitation allows unmarried 
partners to enjoy double benefits, while easily hiding their new financial and 
personal situation.203 
Nevertheless, nonmarital relationships are different from marriage in 
ways that call into question the rationales of the termination-cohabitation 
rule.  First, not all unmarried partners support each other financially during 
the relationship, and a duty of support is not a mutual legal obligation in 
nonmarital unions, as it is in marriage.204  Second, because nonmarital rela-
tionships are not formalized, it is hard to penetrate them and determine 
their nature: Are the partners roommates, friends, or intimate?  It could be 
even more challenging to determine effectively the economic relationships 
within them.205 
States have taken three different approaches to the issue of spousal-
support recipients who cohabit.  Some states have mandated the termination 
of alimony upon proof of cohabitation, regardless of the economic implica-
tions of the new partnership on the alimony recipients (that is, without proof 
that the financial situation of the alimony recipient has improved as a result of 
the relationship).206  A second approach has been to use a rebuttable presumption 
that cohabitation causes a financial change that justifies termination or modi-
fication of alimony.207  Importantly, the establishment of presumption shifts 
  
202. Northrup v. Northrup, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (N.Y. 1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting) 
(“Today’s decision leaves the courts powerless to relieve the former husband of the obligation 
of subsidizing his former wife’s affairs no matter how unfair this may be under the 
circumstances.”). 
203. E.g., Scharwath v. Scharwath, 702 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Miss. 1997) (“The parties who live in 
cohabitation can easily and purposely keep their condition of mutual financial support 
concealed from the paying spouse, as well as from courts seeking only financial 
documentation before it will grant a modification.”). 
204. Perry, supra note 198, at 12–13.  Furthermore, even if the cohabiters do support each other, 
the level of that support may be different between partners; and it is clear that even if 
economic interdependency exists, such is not created immediately, as it is upon marriage. 
205. Furthermore, the assumption that the alimony should be terminated because the recipient 
has a new partner who can support her is problematic because, as demography indicates, after 
two years most cohabitations either end or have converted into marriage.  See Aloni, supra 
note 110, at 581.  Even more fundamentally, because all states allow for unilateral no-fault 
divorce, and some states have repealed their doctrines of necessaries, the idea that an alimony 
recipient’s new spouse is going to support her is based on dated notions. 
206. ALA. CODE § 30-2-55 (Supp. 2011) (“Any decree of divorce providing for periodic 
payments of alimony shall be modified by the court to provide for the termination of such 
alimony upon petition of a party to the decree and proof that the spouse receiving such alimony has 
remarried or that such spouse is living openly or cohabiting with a member of the opposite 
sex.”); 750 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/510 (West 2013). 
207. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4323(a)(1) (West 2013). 
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the burden of proof to the alimony recipient who needs to demonstrate that 
there is no financial change that justifies the termination of maintenance.  
And still other states have taken a third approach: They demand proof of 
change in the recipient’s financial situation due to the cohabitation.208  In 
many states, the rule is codified in statute; in some others, it is court-created. 
Besides the three approaches noted above, variations exist in what is 
considered a cohabiting couple for the purposes of termination or modifica-
tion of spousal support.  For example, New York authorizes termination of 
alimony if the recipient “habitually” lives with a person.209  Under this regime, 
the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, disapproved 
termination of alimony for a woman whose relationship with her partner was 
described as “intermittent intimacy with the same male, being more than a ‘brief 
encounter’ and perhaps a ‘liaison dangereuse.’”210  In another case, a different 
court held that termination was not warranted when a recipient was merely sharing 
an apartment with another man in the manner of a housemate, because sexual rela-
tions are a required component.211  Other states have been more explicit about 
the need for a sexual relationship between the partners.  For example, Illinois spe-
cifically demands that the relationship be “conjugal.”212 
A different approach has been adopted in the Massachusetts Alimony 
Reform Act of 2011, which has been characterized as “an about-face that 
could reverberate across the country”213 and is the most contemporary model 
to deal with alimony termination.214  Among a few interesting issues that the 
  
208. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-86(b) (2009) (“[T]he Superior court may . . . suspend, 
reduce or terminate the payment of periodic alimony upon a showing that the party receiving 
the periodic alimony is living with another person under circumstances which the court finds 
should result in the modification, suspension, reduction or termination of alimony because 
the living arrangements cause such a change of circumstances as to alter the financial needs of 
that party.”); In re Marriage of Dwyer, 825 P.2d 1018 (Colo. App. 1991) (holding that in 
Colorado mere cohabitation was not sufficient to terminate alimony to cohabiting ex-wife, 
and stating that cohabitation that diminishes or eliminates the wife’s need for support could 
warrant a modification or termination of alimony). 
209. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 248 (McKinney 2010). 
210. Watson v. Watson, 331 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972). 
211. See Citron v. Citron, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977). 
212. 750 ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/510 (West 2013) (“if the party receiving maintenance 
cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis”); cf. TEX. FAM. 
CODE. ANN. § 8.056 (2006). 
213. See Jess Bidgood, Alimony in Massachusetts Gets Overhaul, With Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2011, at A11. 
214. A similar (but not identical) reform is currently being discussed in Connecticut.  See H.R. 
5509, 2012 Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012). 
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regime raises,215 the statute does not specifically mention that sexual conduct 
between the cohabitants is required in order to show that the “persons” maintain a 
common household.216  Thus, one could ask whether a relationship between 
an alimony recipient and her best friend, who live together in a way that pro-
duces a “benefit in the life of either or both”217 and creates some emotional 
and economic dependency, would be cause for termination or suspension of 
alimony.  Similarly, the statute could rationally be interpreted as allowing alimony 
termination for a recipient who lives with and is supported by her parents. 
To clarify, the cohabitation-termination rule is no longer a private matter 
arising between divorced persons.  Rather, it is a rule enforced by the state, and its 
alleged purpose is to prevent or stop cases of unjust enrichment by virtue of 
nonformalized unions.  As noted, in numerous states the termination-
cohabitation rule shifts the burden of proof to the cohabitant to show that the co-
habitation does not create economic interdependency; other states order automatic 
termination upon showing of mere cohabitation.  Moreover, alimony is a 
state-created legal obligation that is granted by a court decree.  Conceptually, 
if a spouse does not support his ex- or current partner, the burden of support 
  
215. The Massachusetts statute is a prime example of the problems associated with attempts to as-
cribe marital-like obligations to non-registered partners.  According to the statutes, the 
“persons” at stake are deemed to maintain a common household “when they share a primary 
residence together with or without others.”  MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(d)(1) 
(LexisNexis 2011).  This definition raises the question of whether couples who do not share 
residency but who might create their financial interdependency should be exempted from al-
imony termination.  In addition, the arbitrary nature of the rule is evident by the requirement 
of three months living before termination of alimony is warranted, a time that does not 
necessarily bear out the premise that the cohabitation generates economic dependency.  
Moreover, the ambiguous statutory language that leaves full discretion to the courts to 
determine whether someone is part of a couple encourages litigation and often necessitates 
private investigators to dig into private lives in order to prove the nature of the relationships. 
216. The statute authorizes the court to suspend, reduce, or terminate alimony if the payer shows 
“that the recipient spouse has maintained a common household . . . with another person for a 
continuous period of at least 3 months.”  MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 49(d) (LexisNexis 
2011).  According to the statutory language, “[p]ersons are deemed to maintain a common 
household when they share a primary residence together with or without others.”  Id. § 
49(d)(1).  The statute then provides some factors that may be considered by the court to 
determine “whether the recipient is maintaining a common household.”  The factors the 
court can examine are: “(i) oral or written statements or representations made to third parties 
regarding the relationship of the persons; (ii) the economic interdependence of the couple or 
economic dependence of 1 person on the other; (iii) the persons engaging in conduct and 
collaborative roles in furtherance of their life together; (iv) the benefit in the life of either or 
both of the persons from their relationship; (v) the community reputation of the persons as a 
couple; or (vi) other relevant and material factors.”  Id. 
217. Id. § 49(d)(1)(iv). 
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moves to the state.218  The cohabitation-termination rule is, thus, a regulatory 
mechanism to recognize partnerships outside of the partners’ commands. 
2. Social Welfare 
In the welfare context, deprivative recognition is less prevalent and is 
currently used in only a minority of states.  In the rest of the states, mere 
cohabitation with a partner does not change the definition of the family unit.219  To 
clarify, in many states, living with an unrelated adult may change eligibility for 
welfare because in-kind assistance is calculated in determining eligibility.  But in 
states that apply deprivative recognition in the welfare context, additional support 
to the family is not the determinant factor; rather, the relevant factor is the 
cohabitation—and the impact of considering in-kind assistance is different 
than that of including the income of an additional person. 
A reasonable explanation for the limited use of deprivative recognition 
in this area lies in notorious earlier regulations that are commonly known as 
“man in the house” rules or “substitute father” rules.220  These laws aimed to 
eliminate access to funds under Aid to Dependent Children (the older welfare 
regime)221 by women who cohabited with men.  One of the rationales for the 
rule222 was that if there was a man in the home he was considered the breadwinner, 
and thus his income had to be included in the means test—which resulted in elimi-
nation of the recipient’s welfare benefits.223  The enforcement of man-in-the-
house rules was accompanied by unscheduled visits by social workers and even 
midnight raids to catch unmarried cohabitants.224  The practice ended in 
1968 when the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Alabama’s substitute father 
  
218. Cf. Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 957, 969 (2000) (“By declaring a woman to be a man’s wife or widow at common law, 
courts shielded the public fisc from the potential claims of needy women, effectively 
deflecting those claims inward to a particular private, family unit.”). 
219. See Robert A. Moffitt et al., Cohabitation and Marriage Rules in State TANF Programs, at ix 
(RAND Labor & Population Working Paper Series, Paper No. WR-585-1, 2009) (“[M]ost 
states disregard unrelated cohabitor vendor and cash payments to the TANF recipient and 
her children.”). 
220. See generally Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE 
L.J. 1347 (1963). 
221. See Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401–406, 49 Stat. 620, 627–29 (establishing Aid to 
Dependent Children).  In 1962, an amendment to the Act changed the program’s name to “Aid and 
Services to Needy Families with Children.”  King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 311 n.1 (1968). 
222. Another rationale was the alleged immorality of these arrangements, and these rules and their 
concomitant enforcement practices targeted mainly African Americans.  Kaaryn Gustafson, 
The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 649 (2009). 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 649–50. 
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regulation.225  Since then “welfare offices devoted markedly less attention to 
the men involved in the lives of women receiving welfare.”226 
Yet even today a few states still use deprivative recognition in order to 
disqualify unmarried partners from eligibility to Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF), or to reduce the benefit.227  TANF is a federal assis-
tance program that provides support to needy children and their families.228  
The states, not the federal government, individually define the “family 
unit.”229  Eligibility for the program is limited to families with children.230  
Most interesting for this Article’s purpose is the way that states treat households 
with cohabiting unmarried partners when one of the partners is not the child’s 
legal parent. 
Unsurprisingly, California, always a “leader in . . . punitive approaches to 
welfare reform,”231 still has a policy that recognizes cohabitation for purposes 
of reducing the welfare amount.232  According to the unrelated-adult-male 
rule, the state imposes a duty on an unrelated adult male to make a minimum 
financial contribution to the family equal to the amount that it would cost 
him to provide living expenses for himself (amazingly, “unrelated female 
adults” are exempted and are not required to make any contribution).233  This 
sum is reduced from the welfare grant and could result in a significant decrease 
in benefits.234  The regulations are limited to conjugal partners only.  While 
there is no specific mention of sexual activity, the regulations exclude “roomer 
  
225. See King 392 U.S. at 333–34. 
226. Gustafson, supra note 222, at 651. 
227. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104–193, §§ 401–02, 110 Stat. 2105, 2113–15 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601–02 
(2006)). 
228. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (reauthorized and revised by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006)). 
229. See Primus & Beeson, supra note 55, at 196. 
230. See id. at 196–97. 
231. Gustafson, supra note 222, at 644, 659 (describing California as “one of the most aggressive 
states . . . in investigating and prosecuting welfare fraud cases”). 
232. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 11351.5 (West 2001); Russell v. Carleson, 111 Cal. Rptr. 
497 (Ct. App. 1973) (affirming the constitutionality of the law). 
233. CalWORKs Handbook: Unrelated Adult Male, COUNTRY OF SANTA CLARA §§ 20.1.2, 20.4 
(Feb. 5, 2007), http://www.sccgov.org/ssa/afdc/afchap20.pdf. 
234. See Moffitt et al., supra note 219, at 10.  Similarly, in calculating eligibility for General 
Assistance (support to the very poor who do not qualify for other public assistance), 
California reduces aid to recipients who share housing with relatives or nonrelatives who have 
no duty to support them.  CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE, § 17000.5 (West 2011); PUBLIC 
BENEFITS HANDBOOK: GENERAL ASSISTANCE, GENERAL RELIEF, BENCHMARK INST. 
3/5, available at http://benchmarkinstitute.org/our_training/_PBChapter3.pdf. 
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and boarder” from responsibility.235  To be exempt, the unrelated adult male 
“must have separate sleeping facilities which could be considered a rental 
unit.”  The regulation provides specific examples of such a unit, including “a 
separate bedroom or porch.”  The regulation warns, however, that “the couch 
in the living room is not considered a rental unit.”236  Nonintimate partners 
who share residency (for example, housemates) need to provide an affidavit 
with appropriate evidence in order to be exempted (such as a rent receipt or 
evidence that they share different rooms).237 
Only two other states use such an aggressive method of deprivative 
recognition.  In Oklahoma, unrelated partners’ incomes are deemed fully part 
of the household income, thus very likely to reduce TANF eligibility.238  
Likewise, in 2011, Kansas revised its regulation so that income of a “cohabiting 
boyfriend or girlfriend” will be considered in determining TANF eligibility 
and benefits.239  The purpose of the policy is to “treat cohabiting couples simi-
lar to married couples.”  Friends are specifically exempted but need to file a 
statement to be excused.240  Three other states (Minnesota, North Dakota, 
and Wyoming) automatically reduce a recipient’s grant when she lives in 
the same residence with another adult.  And one state, South Dakota, reduces a re-
cipient’s grant when another adult living in the home pays any amount toward 
shelter costs (it seems that this regulation could, in fact, be applied to 
nonintimate partners).241 
It is hard to predict if deprivative recognition in this arena will get more 
pervasive.  A study found that from 1993 to 2006 five states modified their 
policies to target unmarried partners, while two others (Oregon and Virginia) 
have changed their laws in the opposite direction (not to recognize these cou-
ples in regard to responsibilities).242 
  
235. See CalWORKs Handbook: Unrelated Adult Male, supra note 235, § 20.1.5. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. § 20.2. 
238. Moffitt et al., supra note 219, at 10–12.  Interestingly, to encourage marriage with someone 
who is not the father’s child, Oklahoma deems only half of the income of the stepfather 
relevant to eligibility.  Id. at 11–12. 
239. Memorandum from Kathe Decker to Econ. & Emp’t Support Program Adm’rs 5 (Oct. 25, 2011), 
available at http://content.dcf.ks.gov/ees/keesm/implem_memo/11-1-11%20implementation%20 
memo.pdf. 
240. See id. at 5–6. 
241. Moffitt et al., supra note 219, at 7. 
242. Id. at 23–24. (In Moffitt’s table, only four states changed their policy to employ what this 
Article calls deprivative recognition.  But since the publication of Moffitt’s study, Kansas has 
also changed its policy). 
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3. Traditional Deprivative Recognition as a Regulatory Mechanism 
Is traditional deprivative recognition a necessary response to the changes 
in family structure and to the risk that people use their nonmarital status to 
gain financially, or is it an unfair mechanism that strips people of vital financial 
resources? 
One sensible perspective is that the policy of deprivative recognition only 
unveils the real function of the family and it is therefore a justified policy.  It is 
an appealing apparatus because it responds to the proliferation of nonmarital 
partners who enjoy more benefits than their household justifies.243  Such a 
mechanism allows the state to divert resources to families who truly need 
them, or who need them more.  Amy Wax, for example, explains that the 
previous welfare policies, which allowed unmarried partners to benefit from 
their nonmarital status, were “viewed as unfair and corrosive of public morals.”244  
Policy that benefits nonmarital unions, moreover, encourages people not to 
get married—in order to get bigger grants—thus standing in contradiction to 
the welfare metastrategy of promoting marriage.245  Others could consider 
deprivative recognition as a progressive course, as it departs from brightline 
rules of marriage versus nonmarriage and employs a functional test to uncover 
the relationship between the partners and their eligibility for the benefit, 
based on the purpose of the law.246 
Looking more broadly at the context in which traditional deprivative 
recognition has been, and is, operating reveals why it is not normatively justi-
fied.  I suggest that deprivative recognition is more than a functional test to 
examine the genuine structure of the family vis-à-vis the benefit at stake.  Rather, 
deprivative recognition is a selective regulatory mechanism policing only be-
haviors that are deemed immoral.  Further, deprivative recognition generally 
produces inequity because it most often results in economic maldistribution 
of resources between the partners and between the state and the partners.  Finally, 
  
243. Analogously, when an alimony recipient does not get married only to avoid the termination 
of alimony, deprivative recognition is an effective remedy responding to the recipient’s 
strategic behavior and reflects the real family unit. 
244. Amy L. Wax, Norm Change or Judicial Decree? The Courts, the Public, and Welfare Reform, 32 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 52 (2009). 
245. See, e.g., Brenda Cossman, Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of 
Dependency, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 415, 460–81 (2005) (documenting how 
one of the main purposes of TANF has been to promote marriage and traditional family 
values and structure). 
246. Cf. POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 126 (“A legal system in a pluralistic society that values all 
families should meld as closely as possible the purposes of a law with the relationships that 
that law covers.  Marriage is not the right dividing line.” (emphasis omitted)). 
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deprivative recognition may halt the creation of new kinships.  I provide four 
grounds for the assertion that deprivative recognition is an unjust policy. 
First, the state uses deprivative recognition in areas that traditionally 
have been deemed to have moral implications.247  Deprivative recognition, at 
least as it currently operates, is restricted mainly to eliminating alimony and 
welfare and thus reflects the long-held tradition that “transfer payments to assist 
needy children and their caregivers are considered pathological (‘welfare as we 
know it’), while transfer payments for widowed and disabled persons stay 
respectable, a kind of insurance.”248  Thus, benefits to widows and widowers 
are only terminated if they remarry, but not if they cohabit.  Conversely, ali-
mony termination “punishes women for engaging in activity deemed immoral 
by legislators.”249  The moral nature of deprivative recognition can be best 
seen by the fact that some states—ironically, those that employ the harshest 
method of deprivative recognition—exclude same-sex couples from alimony 
termination.250 
The selective nature of deprivative recognition is clearer when one real-
izes that it stands in contradiction to the trend toward privatization of support 
in family law.  Brenda Cossman observes that in the United States there are 
three (sometimes conflicting) influential conservative values: fiscal conserva-
tism, libertarianism, and social conservatism.  Cossman demonstrates that in 
family law the tendency is generally to shift the cost of support from the state 
to the private sphere—to the partners (fiscal conservatism).251  But “[t]he pri-
vatization of support obligations has occurred only to the extent that it can be 
made consistent with the social conservative vision of the family.”252  The social 
conservative vision of family is one that favors marriage over other relationships.  
  
247. Another theory that could explain why the state terminates benefits that stem from non-
recognition in selective cases is the greater political power possessed by the constituencies 
that enjoy the benefit.  For example, it is probable that the law maintains cohabiting couples’ 
survivor benefits while terminating or reducing their TANF because the elderly—
beneficiaries of survivor’s benefits—enjoy greater electoral power than poor women who 
receive TANF benefits.  The two theories—that deprivative recognition is selective based on 
morality or based on political power—can coexist, because even if one accepts that the 
different treatment is related to political power, then the policy is still unjust (because the 
groups that can protect their interests through the political process are treated more 
favorably). 
248. Bernstein, supra note 27, at 182. 
249. Ullman, supra note 199, at 480; see also HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 463 (1968) (discussing the termination or reduction 
of alimony due to cohabitation under the rubric of “misconduct” of the wife). 
250. See Bornstein, supra note 195, at 1035–36. 
251. Cossman, supra note 245, at 420–21. 
252. Id. at 421. 
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Supporting this view of conflicting social and fiscal conservatism is the case of 
spousal-support termination.253  By terminating alimony (without imposing 
any automatic obligations on the new partnerships), the state diminishes the 
scope of private responsibility and even takes a risk that the previous recipi-
ents of alimony will now rely on welfare.254 
A second justification for the argument that deprivative recognition is a 
selective legal mechanism is that it stands in striking incongruity to the way 
states are reluctant to ascribe marriage-like rules when they are actively sought 
by one of the partners.  The justifications that states proffer for not extending legal 
protections to unmarried couples contradict the justifications for employing 
deprivative recognition. 
California, a state that exercises an aggressive deprivative recognition 
policy in cases of both alimony and welfare, is a paradigmatic example of contra-
dictory policies.  In the two doctrines, the presence of a man in a woman’s 
apartment raises a rebuttable presumption about financial interdependency.  
Ironically, while presuming economic interdependency based merely on 
common residency, California denies the extension of such a presumption 
when an unmarried couple seeks benefits or protections (both for recognizing 
obligations between the partners and for affording the benefits that spouses 
enjoy with respect to third parties).  For instance, unmarried cohabitants in 
California have no standing to sue for loss of consortium based on injury to or 
the death of their partner;255 cannot claim a cause of action for negligent infliction 
of emotional distress based on witnessing injury to their partner;256 cannot 
sue for the wrongful death of their partner;257 and are not eligible to claim 
unemployment compensation benefits if they quit work to accompany their 
  
253. Deprivative recognition in the welfare area works somewhat similarly: Terminating welfare 
could ostensibly lead to the privatization of support (the man, not the state, will support the 
welfare recipient).  But that is true only assuming that the result of the reduction or 
elimination of the grant will lead to that, rather than to the separation (or at least the 
noncohabitation) of the couple.  The policy is more consistent with the social conservative 
view because the policy is “familialing and gendering.”  Fiscal conservatives are more focused 
on transforming the mother into a productive worker, and so could choose a different 
strategy.  See id. at 480–81. 
254. Indeed, according to the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, a court would not enforce—or 
would only partially enforce—a waiver of alimony in a prenuptial agreement if it would result 
in the recipient’s eligibility for public assistance.  A similar provision that prohibits the 
termination of alimony in such case—or court decisions that deny termination of alimony 
because the recipient would be eligible for public assistance—do not exist, as far as I know. 
255. Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588–90 (Cal. 1988). 
256. Id. at 588. 
257. Garcia v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 184 Cal. Rptr. 390, 393 (Ct. App. 1982). 
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partner (but would be eligible if they were married).258  While cohabitants can 
sue each other to enforce expressed or implied agreements for alimony or 
property distribution, the cohabitation does not shift the burden of proof to 
the cohabitant who denies the obligations, and the contract must be provable 
in any case; in other words, here, a presumption of economic interdependence 
does not exist.259 
Courts often rationalize their decision not to extend rights to unmarried 
couples by reference to evidentiary problems.260  Accordingly, when the state 
does not presume an economic duty between unmarried partners in terms of 
benefits and mutual obligations, it is responding to evidentiary and bureaucratic 
problems in recognizing these couples.  Indeed, exploring and proving the 
economic and emotional nature of such partners involves some difficulties.261  
Moreover, courts are allowed to use presumptions in different way when it 
concerns different issues.  But this problem has not stopped the state from 
raising a presumption of economic interdependency when it seeks to elimi-
nate benefits.  Common residency is sufficient to raise such presumption for 
the purpose of ending or reducing social welfare and alimony.  Thus, there 
should be no difference in presuming economic interdependency for the purposes 
of wrongful death, employment compensation, and alimony upon separa-
tion.262  Presumptions reduce litigation costs for the parties and further judicial 
economy.263  Therefore, I do not argue that courts cannot raise presumption 
of independency in case of terminating a benefit from unmarried partners, 
  
258. Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 663 P.2d 904 (Cal. 1983). 
259. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 121–22 (Cal. 1976); Schafer v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. 
Rptr. 513, 517 (Ct. App. 1986) (ruling that the Marvin remedy is based on contract law). 
260. See, e.g., Norman, 663 P.2d at 910 (“Recognizing and favoring those with established marital 
and familial ties not only furthers the state’s interest in promoting such relationships but 
assures a more readily verifiable method of proof.”). 
261. See, e.g., Garrison, supra note 41, at 311 (“Marital intent is subjective; when not publicly 
expressed, it is extraordinarily hard to prove.”). 
262. In this regard, one could argue that the state can justify recognizing a couple for one purpose 
and not for a different purpose.  Accordingly, it is well established that different 
administrative agencies can examine different factors in different cases.  For example, the 
state’s concerns in granting tax benefits are different from those it has regarding wrongful-
death standing.  But the state cannot raise a presumption based on the same fact 
(cohabitation) and then deny the presumption in another, similar case.  In the same way that 
issue preclusion “prevents the relitigation of an ‘issue’ decided in an earlier proceeding based 
on a different cause of action,” the state cannot argue that the same factor immediately 
presumes economic interdependency—or even immediately terminates alimony—but 
selectively contradicts it right afterward.  Antonio Gidi, Issue Preclusion Effect of Class 
Certification Orders, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1026 (2012); see also Fara Agrusa, Court of 
Appeals Applies the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel to an Administrative Determination, 63 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 154 (1988) (discussing issue preclusion by administrative agencies). 
263. Antonio E. Bernardo et al., A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2000). 
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while refusing to raise such presumption when unmarried partners seek benefits.  
What I argue is that the different treatment is illuminating why the evidential 
inquiry that accompanies request for recognition for benefits by unmarried 
couples cannot be justified alone as a reason to reject their requests.  Moreover, 
deprivative recognition involves termination or withholding of benefit that 
either court (in divorce proceedings) or the state (in welfare) has already 
granted to the party.  Termination of this benefit, thus, requires more caution 
than a decision to grant it. 
The state can also rely on marriage promotion grounds to justify treating 
recognition for the purpose of eliminating benefits differently from the way it 
treats recognition for the purpose of granting benefits.  Surely, employing 
deprivative recognition, while not recognizing unmarried couples in claims 
for recognition that will benefit the partners, is congruent with marriage 
promotion policy.264  By denying such recognition, a state incentivizes couples 
to get married: If a couple wants to enjoy a panoply of rights, the price is marriage.  
And if a couple enjoys benefits from nonrecognition, eliminating those bene-
fits likewise encourages people to get married.   
But even if the two policies are reconcilable, this does not make them legiti-
mate.  Deprivative recognition does not promote marriage—marriage too will 
result in the elimination of the benefit (for example, the income of the spouse 
will be calculated for welfare purposes; alimony will be terminated).  Thus, it 
is doubtful that deprivative recognition encourages marriage, rather than only 
preventing cohabitation in certain populations.  And forcing people to marry 
when they are not ready or do not want to do so is not a tenable policy.265  If 
the purpose of the policy is to cause people not to cohabit (in order to avoid 
benefit termination) then it is also questionable whether it is a wise policy.  
Because most marriages today are preceded by cohabitation, and because having 
another supporting person at home could be (but is not always) financially 
and emotionally advantageous, it may be in the state’s interest to let these 
  
264. For the purpose of this article, I assume that marriage promotion is a permissible and even 
desirable state action.  See generally Kaaryn Gustafson, Breaking Vows: Marriage Promotion, 
the New Patriarchy, and the Retreat from Egalitarianism, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 269, 286–90, 
301–08 (2009) (discussing the purposes of marriage promotion programs and criticizing the 
premise that marriage is the best status for families, arguing that marriage promotion policies 
both capture and further an anti-egalitarian sentiment, but do not implicate protected privacy 
interests). 
265. Cf. Garrison, supra note 41, at 304 (“[M]arriage can be harmful as well as helpful . . . and 
some obvious marriage promotion strategies—for example, marriage incentives that produce 
more ‘shotgun’ marriages—could easily increase the number of weak marriages and thus work 
more harm than good.”). 
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partners stay together.  Finally, it is doubtful that a policy is valid whose pur-
pose is to discourage partners to cohabit for moral reasons alone.  
To clarify, I do not argue that a state has to provide the same protections 
and benefits to married and unmarried partners.266  But withholding benefits 
from unrecognized partners and at the same time denying them protections 
that stem from the very same relationships is tantamount to penalizing these 
partners based on a particular moral viewpoint.267  The consequence of recog-
nizing cohabiting couples in order to eliminate benefits and simultaneously 
not recognizing them commonly (preventing access to other benefits) is not 
simply that they are not provided an advantage, but it is much more burdensome in 
that these couples are penalized for not being married.268  Further, such a policy is 
most harmful to partnerships in which there are power differences between the 
partners, particularly if the wealthier party does not want to make a financial 
commitment.  In such cases, terminating the benefit but not obligating the 
refusing party to take financial responsibility does not promote marriage—it 
promotes economic injustice. 
The third justification for the proposal that deprivative recognition pro-
duces inequity is that it can lead to economic maldistribution.  By calculating 
the income of both partners together in order to terminate a benefit, the state 
assumes—without reason—that the couple is economically interdependent, 
although cohabitation does not warrant any duties of support between the 
couples.269  Indeed, “the mere fact of living together provides little evidence of 
  
266. See REGAN, supra note 119, at 127 (justifying distinctions in treatments of unmarried couples 
for the purpose of the state’s and third parties’ benefits, based on a marriage promotion 
justification). 
267. Cf. Garrison, supra note 41, at 296 (“Because cohabitation typically does not produce the 
same income-pooling benefits as marriage, a policy based on the assumption of income-
pooling by cohabitants is counterfactual and might produce serious inequity . . . .”). 
268. In addition, a marriage promotion policy can encourage marriage in society in some ways, 
like providing couples with counseling, but such an invasion into people’s autonomy in 
choosing relationships exceeds the legitimate authority of the state to promote marriage.  See 
Gustafson, supra note 264, at 303 (“State Healthy Marriage programs may encourage, or even 
require, welfare recipients to attend pro-marriage counseling but do not require them to 
marry.  Some of the initiatives provide welfare recipients who marry more money than they 
currently receive, but do not propose giving unmarried recipients any less than they currently 
receive.”). 
269. There are various studies, with somewhat different results, about the percentage of couples 
who share their incomes.  There are also variations in the patterns of pooling income between 
subgroups of cohabitants.  See BOWMAN, supra note 59, at 138–41.  To generalize, about 50 
percent of cohabitants do pool their incomes to some extent.  See id.  These numbers are 
limited to cohabitating opposite-sex couples.  They do not say anything about nonintimate 
partners who share households, not to mention partners who do not live together. 
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what their relationship means.”270  Thus, the result of deprivative recognition 
could be stripping people of an important financial resource without provid-
ing a new one and without considering whether there has been an economic 
change in their situation. 
Fourth, deprivative recognition is an undesirable policy because it constructs 
a palpable barrier to the creation of new kinships and relationships.  That is, 
partners must consider carefully before they move in together because the financial 
consequences—or, at least, the invasive inquiry that will most likely occur—will be 
harmful.  Moreover, this hurdle to the creation of new living arrangements targets 
precisely the groups that need less-traditional living arrangements for support.  
Those who live with relatives, friends, and caregivers in the same apartment are 
overwhelmingly the elderly, the disabled, and people from low-income 
populations.271  It is true that deprivative recognition generally exempts 
nonintimate partnerships.  But deprivative recognition policies impose a bureau-
cracy to investigate the nature of the relationships, which is already a burden 
(one reason is because it could require people to define their relationships 
when they are not ready to do so).  In the welfare context, for example, 
having an unrelated adult in one’s apartment almost immediately invites 
questions from social workers and could easily deter people from living together.272 
  
270. Garrison, supra note 41, at 312. 
271. See, e.g., Jong Won Min, Cultural Competency: A Key to Effective Future Social Work With 
Racially and Ethnically Diverse Elders, 86 FAM. SOC’Y 347, 351 (2005) (describing how 
family and support networks are especially important to elderly people of color). 
272. We can infer deprivative recognition’s harm to the creation of new supportive networks from 
the following story.  Tadeusz M. Sypek and Maria S. Sypek had a separation agreement that 
included a cohabitation-termination provision: “Support payments shall terminate upon the 
Wife's remarriage or if the Wife takes up residency with another man to whom she is not 
married.”  In this case the parties themselves—rather than the state—contracted about this 
term.  But the way that the provision was enforced was the same as with the statutory 
cohabitation-termination rule.  Thus, in this case, the husband sued the wife to terminate 
alimony payments after the ex-wife moved into the apartment of a ninety-seven year old 
blind person who “cannot ambulate without a walker, and . . . has a pacemaker, a hearing aid, 
a truss for his rupture, and a leg brace.”  The ex-wife’s job was as his housekeeper and 
caregiver.  The ex-husband claimed that the separation agreement said that termination of 
alimony would take place upon her residing with another man, regardless of the type of 
relationship.  The court, quite angry about the injustice and absurdity of the claim, rejected 
the husband’s suit and obliged him to pay attorney’s fees.  But this case shows the harm to the 
creation of networks of support: When someone needs to fear a termination of alimony when 
moving for work, this is a real hurdle to the development of new living arrangements.  This is 
of course an extreme case and one that was initiated from an act of private ordering, but there 
is no reason to believe that cohabitation-termination rules would not function the same way.  
See Sypek v. Sypek, 497 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851–53 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
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B. Unintended Deprivative Recognition 
Unintended deprivative recognition is another subcategory of purely 
ascriptive recognition.  Currently, the only case—that I know of—that falls 
under this category is the new financial aid rule.  While the results of unin-
tended deprivative recognition are similar to those of traditional deprivative 
recognition (that is, the partners are deprived of a vital benefit that stems 
from their relationships, while being denied other benefits that stem from 
recognition), here the state actually has some interest in the cultural recogni-
tion of the relationships. 
The new rule for calculating federal financial aid eligibility for dependent 
students with unmarried cohabiting parents is different from traditional 
deprivative recognition and may be the harbinger of a new type of deprivative 
recognition—one that does not stem from animus against less traditional 
families.273  It is unique for a few reasons.  First, unlike the previously discussed 
examples of deprivative recognition, the financial aid rule is imposed by the 
federal government (as opposed to the states).  Second, it responded to a demand 
for cultural recognition of a historically marginalized group.  Third, the rule 
could be justified, as argued by Nancy Polikoff, as applying to parents rather 
than to partners—a progressive policy that shifts the focus from marital status 
to children’s needs.274  Accordingly, the parents should share the burden of 
raising the children (after they reach college age), and their marital status has 
nothing to do with the amount of financial aid that their children receive. 
Despite good intentions behind the rule and the progressive justification 
for it, the new federal financial aid rule also leads to deprivation, because under the 
current American legal system, parenthood and coupling are not entirely separate.  
Significant financial benefits accrue to married parents that are unavailable to 
unmarried parents merely because of their marital status.  The deprivative nature of 
  
273. It is possible to categorize the financial aid rule differently: decoupling parentage from adult 
relationships (recognizing parenthood without ascribing partnership rights on the parents).  
Under this category, parents are recognized solely for their duties as parents, but if they are 
partners their relationships go unrecognized.  The question of recognizing parenthood 
without recognizing partnership is complex, and exceeds the scope of this paper.  For the 
purpose of this paper and for the category of unintended deprivative recognition, suffice it to 
say that, as recognized by several courts during the litigation of same-sex marriage, 
segregating parenthood from partnership is not easy; and when the partnership is 
unrecognized, this has direct financial consequences on the parents.  See, e.g., Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 973 (2011). 
274. Nancy Polikoff, Financial Aid Changes for Children of Same-Sex (and Other Unmarried) 
Couples, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:15 AM) 
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.com/2013/04/financial-aid-changes-for-
children-of.html. 
Deprivative Recognition 1331 
 
unintended deprivative recognition stems from its asymmetrical nature: It 
recognizes the partners only for purposes of withholding a benefit, and be-
stows some cultural recognition on some parents who were disregarded by the 
law previously.  But the recognition still results in financial determinant to the 
parents. 
C. The Regulatory Effect of Deprivative Recognition 
Analyzing deprivative recognition uncovers another layer of existing 
regulation that affects the lives of those in unrecognized relationships.  While 
some scholars, such as Lieb275 and Rosenbury,276 astutely acknowledge that some 
regulations already direct and influence the lives of the unrecognized, this 
Article exposes a layer of regulations that thus far has not been explored.  
Regulation of nonmarital unions is more complex than generally assumed and 
sends a complicated (but well-understood) message: Deprivative recognition 
signals that some people should get married—otherwise, they will be penalized (by 
withholding some support but not adding new sources of support).  Alterna-
tively, partners who need support (from the state or from their ex) should not 
live together.  At the same time—despite the fact that no state mandates obli-
gations of support between unmarried partners—by withdrawing other sources 
of support from the new partner, this regulation both assumes and communicates 
that unmarried intimate partners are expected to support each other financially.  
By focusing on alimony—an order that is provided primarily to women—
deprivative recognition also sustains traditional gender roles, assuming that 
men do and should support women.  Nonintimate partners, conversely, are 
exempt from such requirements, thus reinforcing the idea that nonintimate 
unions are still inferior to others and cannot serve as primary relationships.  In 
such ways, deprivative regulation polices people’s interpersonal behaviors. 
The influence of deprivative recognition and its prevalence could increase 
the more that the number of nonmarital unions grows.  Further, it is unclear 
whether nonintimate relationships will remain immune from deprivative 
recognition.  Recall that the most progressive alimony law (Massachusetts’) 
has already moved—at least theoretically—toward interdependency, rather 
  
275. LEIB, supra note 157, at 78–79 (arguing that the law is already present in the life of friends 
and providing examples from criminal and corporate law in which friendship is given special 
consideration). 
276. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 202–07 (contending that, by ignoring friendship, the law 
regulates people’s preferences in terms of organizing their relationships around marital 
relationships while devaluing others). 
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than sexual activity, as the main factor determining recognition of partnerships 
that warrant termination of alimony.  And, concerning the legal recognition 
of nonintimate partners, if such partners were to enjoy similar benefits as other 
partners, what reason is there to distinguish them from intimate partners—
including for the purpose of imposing duties?  
Indeed, recognizing friends exemplifies one of the tensions that exist between 
the aspiration of recognizing the plurality of relationships and the adverse 
effect that such recognition can have.  Taking a simple approach for the moment, 
the state is faced with two options—both result in undesirable consequences.  
One, the state could simply ignore friendship, as it currently does.  But as has 
been argued in Part II, complete nonrecognition of friendship relationships 
results in both cultural and economic harm.  Further, if a couple of friends 
create a relationship that is financially and emotionally interdependent, why 
should it have a different consequence on the receipt of alimony or welfare benefits 
than intimate relationships have?  Alternatively, the state can legally recognize 
relationships between friends who live together for a certain time for purposes of 
rights, protections, and duties.  Such legal recognition, however, can result in 
cultural misrecognition because not all friendships are the same, and many do 
not create economic interdependency.  Such recognition can also result in 
economic injustice if the friends are not economically interdependent.     
Recognition of nonmarital unions thus raises the question whether it is 
possible to legally recognize more types of relationships without causing financial 
detriment and cultural harm; and if the answer is yes, then the question becomes, 
how can this be done?  Assuming, for the moment, that the state has an interest in 
legally recognizing partners in nonmartial unions (for duties and for protections), 
such recognition has to follow some sort of ascription.  But ascription, as we have 
already seen, raises questions of economic injustice and cultural recognition.  Put 
differently, is there a way to settle the tension between cultural recognition 
(recognizing more types of relationships) and distributive justice in the law gov-
erning unmarried partnerships?  
The tension between cultural recognition and distributive justice is not 
unique to family law.  It is an inherent tension that stands at the center of the 
debate in other scholarly disciplines.  Understanding this tension helps one to 
better understand both the tensions between proposals for more recognition 
of relationships and the possible resultant financial detriment, and the way to 
resolve this tension.  The next Part returns to the scholarship discussed in 
Part II and examines how to integrate the double-edged sword of recognition 
into proposals for legal change. 
Deprivative Recognition 1333 
 
IV. RECOGNITION AND REDISTRIBUTION IN FAMILY LAW 
The previous Part has shown how ascription can lead to economic injustice.  
Responding to this finding, in this Part, I take one step back from deprivative 
recognition to examine more broadly the connection between cultural recognition 
and economic redistribution in the law of unmarried partners.  My goal is 
to offer a theoretical tool that will settle the tensions between cultural 
recognition and economic justice in family law.  In other words, I investi-
gate how family law can fulfill its dual fundamental goals—redistributive 
justice and cultural recognition of relationships—such that neither goal 
negates the other. 
To accomplish this, I look at the question from a theoretical angle.  I 
first examine what cultural recognition means as a philosophical and political 
value.  I identify the rise of cultural-dignitary recognition with the appearance 
of multiculturalism and briefly present the main and most recent theories of 
recognition.  I then introduce Nancy Fraser’s critique of recognition as an inade-
quate social justice claim that does not meet the demands of distributive jus-
tice and her alternate analytical perspective of recognition and redistribution.  
Using Fraser’s work as a point of departure, I turn back to the law of unmarried 
partners.  Extrapolating on Fraser’s work, in Part IV.B, I explore how Fraser’s 
dual paradigm should guide family law in the search for policy that accom-
modates the needs of nonmarital partners. 
A. Recognition Versus Redistribution 
Cultural recognition, as a social justice claim, has gained prominence in 
social movements and politics since the 1960s.277  Such claims have been typical 
and central to struggles over sexual, gender, and racial equality.278  The debate 
over what exactly “recognition” means is the subject of much discussion.279  
For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to note that the struggle for 
recognition is characterized by a political group that demands cultural ac-
  
277. See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 37–38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994); SIMON THOMPSON, 
THE POLITICAL THEORY OF RECOGNITION: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 2 (2006) 
(suggesting that recognition as a political claim emerged from the collapse of democratic 
consensus during the late 1960s and was replaced by political movements that embraced 
multicultural notions). 
278. See FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 33, at 1; Taylor, supra note 277, at 36–37. 
279. See, e.g., Paddy McQueen, Social and Political Recognition, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA 
PHIL., http://www.iep.utm.edu/recog_sp (last updated Apr. 8, 2011). 
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knowledgment for some feature it possesses, a collective identity.280  That is, 
the demand for equality is not conditioned on assimilation to the norms of 
the dominant majority.281 
The origin of recognition as a normative philosophical backbone is old, 
reaching back to Hegel’s well-known dialectic on the master-slave and the 
notion of “the struggle for recognition.”282  Responsible for its resurgence to 
the academic front in the late twentieth century are primarily the theoreti-
cians Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth.  In a nutshell, Taylor asserts that 
recognition “is a vital human need” because people’s identities are shaped, 
formed, and determined by the way other people recognize them.283  Because 
recognition is such a necessity, misrecognition “can inflict a grievous wound, 
saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred.”284  This respect for identity 
should be applied to the public sphere as well.  Taylor also differentiates between 
politics of equal recognition and politics of differences.  The former is founded 
on formal equality and universalism: All subjects are treated similarly.  The 
latter accommodates peoples’ and groups’ uniqueness and differences while 
not forcing assimilation to the dominant culture.  A politics of cultural recog-
nition supports the politics of differences.  Similarly, Honneth conceptualizes all 
social and political conflicts as expressions of the struggle for recognition.285 
The intervention of the American critical theorist Nancy Fraser is in 
pointing out the inadequacy of recognition as a sole normative claim.  Her 
central argument is that the rise of the politics of recognition has eclipsed the 
  
280. See THOMPSON, supra note 277, at 3. 
281. See FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 33, at 7. 
282. See generally G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 230–70 (A.V. Miller trans., 
1977).  In this subchapter, Hegel tells the story of two consciousnesses that try to achieve 
independence in the world.  But one consciousness understands that it cannot reach approval 
and independence without the recognition of the other consciousness.  The problem is that 
the existence of the other consciousness, which also looks for independence, threatens the 
independence of the first consciousness and it starts “a life-and-death struggle.”  In the 
struggle, the two self-consciousnesses confront one another.  The struggle ends in the 
creation of an asymmetrical relationship between a master—who won because he was ready 
to sacrifice his life—and a slave—who was ready to give up in order not to lose his life.  
Ostensibly, the master becomes superior but he does not enjoy the recognition he receives 
from the slave, who is his inferior.  The slave, on the other hand, succeeds in developing a 
better sense of self-consciousness and creates a world through his work.  This change 
gradually leads them to reconceptualize their relationship in a way that each recognizes the 
other.  See id. 
283. Taylor, supra note 277, at 25–26 (describing “identity” as “a person’s understanding of who 
they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a human being.”). 
284. Id. at 26. 
285. AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL 
CONFLICTS 137–40 (1995). 
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previously dominant politics of redistribution: a social struggle that was focused 
on injustices that stem from socioeconomics and whose remedy was the fair 
distribution of resources.286  Currently, the widely acknowledged injustice is 
misrecognition and, in accordance, the remedy has become recognition—a 
development that has risked neglecting the struggle for distributive justice.  
She also contends that social justice endeavors are presented as focusing on 
pursuing either recognition or redistribution—as offering distinct and opposite 
views on social justice.287  On the surface, according to Fraser, recognition and 
redistribution are incommensurable because they treat group differences in a 
contradictory fashion.  Redistribution is founded on locating classes as a result of an 
unjust political economy and seeking to abolish group differences.  Conversely, 
cultural recognition struggles can either advocate for the celebration of differ-
ences or for the deconstruction of differences.288  When recognition strives to 
celebrate differences and redistribution aims to abolish differences, there are 
tensions between the proposed remedies.  But, according to Fraser, the contradic-
tory nature of these claims is a “false antithesis.”289 
In fact, recognition and redistribution, as “folk paradigms of justice,” are 
not mutually exclusive alternatives.290  Fraser contends that “[v]irtually all real-
world axes of subordination can be treated as two-dimensional,” meaning that 
they all “implicate both maldistribution and misrecognition.”291  For example, 
gender can be interpreted as a classlike differentiation because it structures 
the division between paid productive labor and unpaid domestic work.  The 
remedy in accordance is redistributive redress: the abolition of gender as a 
class.  At the same time, “gender appears as a status differentiation, rooted in 
the status order of society.”292  This status subordination—expressed by sexual 
harassment, domestic violence, unequal representation, and more—is a result 
of devaluing femininity and is a part of the harm of cultural misrecognition. 
While these two harms—cultural and economic—can intersect, they are 
not byproducts of the other; rather, each has some independence.  Addressing 
only one of them will not solve the problem.293  But the two remedies are not 
  
286. See Fraser, supra note 32, at 68, 70–74 (1995) (“[G]roup identity supplants class interest as 
the chief medium of political mobilization.”). 
287. FRASER & HONNETH, supra note 33, at 12–15. 
288. Id. at 15. 
289. Id. at 16. 
290. See id. at 11. 
291. Id. at 25. 
292. Nancy Fraser, Feminist Politics in the Age of Recognition: A Two-Dimensional Approach to 
Gender Justice, 1 STUD. SOC. JUST. 23, 26 (2007). 
293. See id. 
1336 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276 (2014) 
 
easily pursued simultaneously.  Abolishing economic injustice means abolishing 
the gendered division of labor.  If one views gender merely as a redistributive 
problem, then the remedy is abolition of gender as class.294  The remedy for 
cultural injustice is recognition—overcoming sexism and misogyny by revalu-
ing the status and practices of women.  The problem with these two remedies 
is that they could run counter to each other: Redistribution seeks to abolish 
gender differences while recognition seeks to elevate these differences.295 
In order for the dual claims to coincide, Fraser suggests adopting transforma-
tive remedies rather than affirmative remedies.296  Affirmative strategies are 
“remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements 
without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them.”297  Transform-
ative remedies “mean remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes pre-
cisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework.”298  For example, 
consider the politics of identity as applied to gay rights, a strategy that aims to 
present homosexuality as an essentialist identity in order to end discriminatory 
policies (affirmative remedy), rather than confronting and deconstructing the 
societal distinction of gay versus nongay (transformative remedy).299  In the 
distributional aspect, examples of an affirmative remedy include the welfare 
state: programs that help to recover maldistribution but do not change the 
underlying structural problems that cause economic injustice.300  Transforma-
tive strategies in distributive justice are those that reduce social inequality 
without creating stigmatized groups of recipients.301  Fraser contends that the 
combination of transformative recognition with transformative redistribution 
results in the most plausible plan because it is the only combination that 
would not end in perpetuating one or the other injustice. 
  
294. See Fraser, supra note 32, at 76. 
295. Fraser provides similar accounts of contradictory remedies in the sexual and racial arenas.  See id.  
296. Id. at 89–91. 
297. Id. at 82. 
298. Id. 
299. Identity politics is the use and emphasis of a group’s unique character in order to achieve 
political goals.  It promotes an essentialist view of the group.  There is ample critique on the 
use of identity politics, most recently in the gay rights movement.  The main critique is that 
such politics can perpetuate a monolithic or inflexible view of the group.  See, e.g., Richard T. 
Ford, Beyond “Difference”: A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, in LEFT 
LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 55 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002). 
300. Fraser, supra note 32, at 84. 
301. Id. at 85 (“Transformative remedies typically combine universalist social-welfare programmes, 
steeply progressive taxation, macro-economic policies aimed at creating full employment, a 
large non-market public sector, significant public and/or collective ownership, and 
democratic decision-making about basic socioeconomic priorities.”). 
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Tensions similar to those identified by Fraser exist in the law of unmar-
ried partners.  Below, I explain this dilemma in more detail—by applying it to 
specific proposals and theories—and suggest how to resolve it. 
B. Beyond Recognition 
Scholarly proposals aimed at repairing the legal situation of unmarried 
partners face a similar set of tensions as those analyzed by Fraser: recognition 
of people in nonregistered unions requires ascription; ascription often leads to 
contradiction between cultural recognition and economic justice.  Multiple 
scholarly proposals exemplify this tension; the purpose of this Subpart is first 
to deconstruct these disagreements.  Section II.A showed how some family 
law scholarship identifies the combination of economic and cultural injustices 
as the harm of marriage exceptionalism.  But Parts II and III also raise questions 
about the ability of major proposals in family law to encompass both perspec-
tives without reducing one to the other.  One central problem with these proposals 
is that, recognition remedies are decoupled from redistribution remedies, and 
eventually eclipse the latter.  This Part examines these tensions in a theoretical and 
systematic fashion.  At the same time, it helps to reconcile the squabble, suggesting 
a way to rethink regulation in the field in a way that economic justice and cultural 
justice are compatible.   
1. Deconstructing Proposals for Recognition  
The following table catalogues major proposals according to their sug-
gested remedies, allowing us to elucidate the tensions between them and the 
tensions in policies concerning unmarried partners in general.  Ultimately, it 
also shows which proposals will result in maldistribution or misrecognition, 
and which will cross this hurdle and achieve both. 
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TABLE 1. 
 Affirmative Transformative 
Redistribution302 
Ascribing obligations be-
tween partners regardless 
of their clear consent; 
could result in misrecogni-
tion (and maldistribution 
for those who benefit from 
nonrecognition) (ALI, 
Bowman)
Duties and rights are distributed 
based on family function; sup-
ports care-work and vertical rela-
tionships rather than horizontal 
relationships and marriage 
(Polikoff, Fineman) 
Recognition 
Recognition of nonmarital 





Recognition based on the value 
of the relationships rather than 
status; reconstructions of rela-
tionships; blurs relationship dif-
ferences (Rosenbury, Franke) 
 
In the first cell, where redistribution and affirmation intersect, we find 
the proposals whose remedies aim primarily to solve economic 
maldistribution.  These proposals suggest status-based legal recognition of 
marriage—like unions to prevent unfair economic distribution.  They are less 
concerned about cultural misrecognition.303  The redistributive nature of these 
proposals—versus their secondary treatment of dignitary recognition—
becomes clearer because such remedies can result in misrecognition if they assign 
recognition status to people who are not interested in it.  The proposals also 
risk blurring group differentiations since most cohabitants are treated the 
same.  At the same time, the proposals aim to apply only to intimate partners, 
thus still maintaining cultural misrecognition of nonintimate partnerships.  In 
addition, despite their redistributive intention, the proposals can result in 
economic detriment for those who enjoy financial gain from nonrecognition.  
Both proposals are affirmative because they suggest only an ad hoc solution 
  
302. “Redistribution” here is broadly defined and includes wealth transfers between the partners 
and division of resources by the state.  
303. Unjustified economic loss can also be a dignitary loss; and the economic loss stems from the 
devaluation of nonmarital unions.  But the response and the problem are mainly about unfair 
financial loss to nonmarital relationships and the devaluation of domestic work.  Bowman, 
supra note 59, at 9 (providing examples of typical harm that is incurred by unmarried 
cohabitants, all of them related to financial loss).   
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rather than targeting the source of the problem: the focus on status rather 
than on the function of the family.  
In the second cell, where redistribution and transformation intersect, is 
the project of “valuing all families,” as described by Polikoff.304  This is not a 
clear-cut categorization for this work, because Polikoff cares deeply about the 
cultural and symbolic harm that stems from marriage exceptionalism and 
suggests a few remedies to fix it.305  But looking at her model overall and its 
principles clarifies that her remedies are mainly distributive in nature, in the 
sense that they tend to focus on ways in which resources are allocated (and 
stem from her respect for care-work and human need) rather than on the cul-
tural value that is attached to specific types of families.306  In fact, Polikoff’s 
proposal tends to blur group differentiation in that it moves away from status 
(such as marriage and registration) as the prerequisite for fair assistance and 
protection.307  Likewise, Fineman suggests distributive transformative reform.  
Rather than subsidizing and supporting adult relationships, the state needs to 
distribute resources to support “derivative dependents”—those who provide 
support to those who cannot care for themselves—rather than supporting 
adult relationships.308  Her theory thus is transformative because it shifts the 
view from adult relationships to support of care and radically transforms the 
conditions that merit allocation of resources.  Both proposals emphasize vertical 
relationships and de facto give more force to care-work—and thus tend to 
disfavor recognition of types of adult relationships that are not based predom-
inantly on care-work.   
In the third cell, where recognition and affirmation intersect, are proposals 
that support cultural recognition of more types of relationships, and ask to 
distinguish these groups from others.  Those who promote such recognition, 
on the one hand, would encourage the law to bestow greater protections on 
nonmarital partners.  On the other hand, they insist on distinguishing between 
types of nonmarital unions by ascribing different sets of rules to each group.  
In other words, affirmative recognition advocates more group differentiation.  
  
304. POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 123–45.  
305. For example, Polikoff suggests that marriage as a legal institution will be changed to “civil 
partnership,” because “‘[m]arriage’ has a long history of exclusion.”  Id. at 132.  
306. For instance, the “three key principles for valuing all families”—“place the needs of children,” 
“support the needs of children,” and “recognize adult interdependency”—are all concerned 
about distribution of resources, either between the state and the caregivers or between the 
adults.  Id. at 137–43. 
307. Further, as indicated by Rosenbury, Polikoff’s proposal privileges dependent care and 
interdependence “by implying that domestic caregiving should be the essential element of the 
states’ definitions of family.”  Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 200. 
308. FINEMAN, supra note 165, at 161–65. 
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For example, while Leib’s remedies are somewhat distributive in their nature 
(recognizing friendships for specific financial purposes, holding fiduciary duties),309 
he does not want friends to be treated similarly to intimate partners.310  Thus, 
for instance, he does not support the creation of a registry for friendships.  He 
wants the law to recognize the cultural value of friendships, but only as far as 
they remain a distinct group from other types of relationships.  Leib’s proposal is 
affirmative in its nature.  While he acknowledges the structural problems 
associated with marriage exceptionalism, his remedy is limited to providing 
some rights and protections to friends because ending the overall problems of re-
lationship regulation is unrealistic.311  Likewise, Lifshitz advances the “case against 
equalizing the mutual obligations of cohabitants and married partners.”312  Under 
his proposal, cohabitants would be divided into a few types, who would be treated 
differently.  His cultural recognition ratifies strict differentiation between 
types of relationships and is restricted to intimate partnerships.313  
In the fourth cell, where recognition and transformation intersect, are 
the projects that extend value into more types of relationships while decon-
structing hierarchies of relationships.  Rosenbury’s claim is mainly critical of 
the symbolic harm that stems from misrecognition of friendships and the way 
that the legal division between intimate and nonintimate relationships per-
petuates gender inequality.314  Unlike Leib, who is occupied with affirmative 
recognition, Rosenbury’s main enterprise lies in deconstructing the privileges 
attached to in-home (domestic) relationships.315  In a similar fashion, Franke 
  
309. Eric Posner, who reviews Leib’s book, also concludes that “[i]t quickly becomes clear that 
when Leib says friendship should be subject to ‘regulation,’ he does not mean anything as 
radical as that term conjures up.”  Eric A. Posner, Huck and Jim and Law, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.newrepublic.com/book/review/friend-transformation-ethan-leib 
(reviewing ETHAN J.LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—
AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2011)).  
310. Cf. LEIB, supra note 157, at 82–83. 
311. Id. at 72–73. 
312. Lifshitz, supra note 16, at 1569. 
313. See Id. at 1586 (“Yet, even those who believe that, in certain instances, cohabitation 
relationships reflect such implied or relational contracts cannot ignore the fact that, in other 
cases, refraining from marriage indeed reflects a conscious rejection of marriage and its legal 
consequences or that, in yet other cases, cohabitation serves as a kind of trial period prior to 
marriage.”).  
314. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 191 (“This Article illustrates how family law’s failure to 
recognize friendship impedes existing attempts to achieve gender equality through the 
elimination of state-supported gender role expectations.”).  
315. As stated before, Rosenbury’s practical proposal is purposefully general (a guideline).  In 
some interpretations, her remedy is considered affirmative recognition.  Her normative 
commitment, however, is clearly transformative.  Id. at 226 (“Although potentially useful as 
an interim strategy, changing the legal content of either family or friendship will likely not do 
enough to alter the incentives that push women to prioritize domestic relationships over 
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critiques arguments in favor of recognizing friendships as status, because such 
a stand “indulges the misplaced view that, if something important is at stake, 
law should regulate it.”316  At the same time, she encourages the creation of 
more thoughtful menus of options that would recognize different types of 
relationships.317  
Classifying these proposals exposes the problem that is inherent in as-
cription of status upon unregistered parents: when trying to solve one of the 
axes of the harm (either cultural harm or economic injustice) the proposals inflict 
the other injustice on the partners.  This classification thus illustrates the tension 
between cultural recognition and distributive justice in the law of unmarried 
partners.  But Fraser’s framework not only exposes the weaknesses of the 
proposals but also helps in formulating theoretical tools for how to recognize the 
plurality of relationship types while avoiding financial injustice. 
2. Reconstructing the Differences  
In order to find the way to achieve the goals of cultural and distributive 
justice for nonmarital partners, we need to see which combination of recognition 
and distribution would reduce the problems of nonrecognition and 
maldistribution.  From Fraser we know already that transformative remedies 
can work together—but we need to see how to apply it in family law.  
One grouping that does not work together is affirmative redistribution 
(Bowman, ALI) with transformative recognition (Rosenbury, Franke).  The 
project of assigning status and “expanding the shadow of marriage” is at odds 
with the project of deconstructing marriage and the hierarchy of sexual and 
nonsexual relationships.318  Acknowledging the variety and complexity of re-
lationships as proffered by transformative recognition is antithetical to protecting 
only marital-like relationships, as advanced by affirmative redistribution.  
Another pair that is at odds is affirmative redistribution (Bowman, ALI) 
with affirmative recognition (Leib, Lifshitz).  Affirmative redistribution remedies 
aim to reduce differences between some types of relationships (married and 
  
other relationships.  Instead, such approaches risk reinforcing the line between friends and 
family, thereby strengthening the existing hierarchies of care instead of challenging them.  In 
order to alleviate these risks, family law scholars must move beyond the construction of the 
family in order to examine the construction of family law as a whole.”).  
316. Franke, supra note 123, at 2703. 
317. Katherine Franke, Civil Unions in Hawaii and Illinois: How’d They Get it Right?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-franke/civil-
unions-in-hawaii-an_b_827132.html.  
318. See Franke, supra note 123, at 2697 (“The intended effect of the ALI Principles is to enlarge 
marriage law’s shadow.”). 
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cohabitants) by creating statuses that bring more people under the scope of the law 
and treat them similarly to married couples.  Affirmative recognition, on the 
other hand, fosters further group differentiation.  Affirmative recognition 
and affirmative redistribution are counteractive because affirmative redistri-
bution provokes misrecognition of differences between relationship types, 
while affirmative recognition asks to formalize the differences in types of 
relationships.  
A more plausible combination is affirmative redistribution (Bowman, 
ALI) with transformative redistribution (Polikoff, Fineman).  Indeed, in her 
book, Polikoff endorses the ALI recommendations.319  But these two reme-
dies can be at odds, too.  This is because affirmative redistribution is primarily 
about finding a way to create a better division of resources, but is limited to 
marriage-like relationships in which the couples share the same residence.  
Conversely, transformative redistribution is dedicated to changing the deep 
structure of the economics of relationships and to transforming the distribu-
tion of resources from status-based to need-based.  That is, transformative 
redistribution aspires to move away from marital rules toward a vindication of 
caregiving and dependent caregiving, regardless of the status of the family.  
Transformative redistribution (Polikoff, Fineman) paired with transformative 
recognition (Rosenbury, Franke) is the combination that can most readily address 
both economic maldistribution and cultural recognition of diverse types of 
relationships without increasing disparity in those areas.  Transformative 
redistribution would verify that rights and privileges from the state, and obli-
gations between partners, are being distributed based on interdependency and 
the function of the family, rather than on status of the family.  Transformative 
recognition would balance the focus on care-work, vulnerability, and interde-
pendency (factors advanced by transformative redistribution as worthy of 
protection) with recognition of multiple and diverse relationships, including 
those that do not provide care in the traditional sense.  That means that transform-
ative recognition would promote cultural recognition of more relationships (such 
as relationships that are not based on domestic care), which would halt the 
development and entrenchment of “hierarchy of care.”320  
The combination of both remedies can ensure—against the backdrop of 
more legal recognition—that there is recognition of nonrecognition.  In other 
words, both approaches could protect the interest of those partners who do 
not wish to be legally recognized by the state.  Protecting couples from 
  
319. POLIKOFF, supra note 48, at 177–79. 
320. Rosenbury, supra note 122, at 228. 
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deprivative recognition is consistent with both camps because transformative 
redistribution is (presumably) committed to imposing duties based on func-
tion, rather than based on status.321  Transformative recognition, on its side, 
will insist on creating safe libertarian-like space in which people’s relationships can 
still develop and be undefined (that is, the state would not ascribe), as part of 
recognition.322  
Finally, it is possible that there will be some tension between the two ap-
proaches around the existence of registration schemes and their role in family 
law (for example, what are the consequences of being registered or not).  This 
is because transformative redistribution distances itself from status and registration; 
but it appears that transformative recognition, in its quest for recognition of 
diverse relationships, would support the creation of multiple registrations that 
will assist people to organize their lives.  It seems that both camps could agree on 
the existence of a registry if the following conditions are satisfied: First, there is a 
variety of state institutions that culturally recognize the differences between rela-
tionships but do not perpetuate the hierarchy between the relationships.323  
Second, registration is not the only way to gain the full scope of protection 
by the state, but, rather, the function of the family is considered as well.  In 
other words, registration scheme is consistent with economic redistribution 
because registration provides a useful and accessible mean for couples to organize 
the legal consequences that stem from their relationship.  Registration saves the 
need for lawyers, multiple documents, and engaging with bureaucracies.324 
This Article does not propose a unified, detailed plan for transformative 
recognition and redistribution.  Its aim is only to point out that addressing 
  
321. While the Article does not aim to provide a policy for treating unmarried partners, these 
theoretical tools are helpful in crafting policy regarding unmarried partners.  For instance, 
redistribution and recognition can provide a framework for solving the issues that arise when 
nonregistered partners enjoy financial benefits due to their status.  Accordingly, purely 
ascriptive recognition might be a suitable policy in these instances, and might not.  It could 
be a suitable policy in a world where benefits, rights, and protections are allocated by 
functional tests.  In such a scenario, purely ascriptive recognition could bring about the 
cultural recognition of all relationships without perpetuating the notion of fixed, idealized 
relationships, and would respond to the financial reality between partners.  Purely ascriptive 
recognition would not be suitable, as it is unsuitable (and, indeed, deprivative) now, in a 
world where it creates both dignitary harm (generating stigma) and economic 
maldistribution. 
322. Cf. Franke, supra note 123, at 2697 (“marriage as currently defined and governed by law . . . . 
also seeks to govern—and indeed does govern—the lives of those who lie outside the pickets 
of marriage itself.”); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 
59 EMORY L.J. 809, 863 (2010).  
323. See Aloni, supra note 111, at 578 (suggesting a registration scheme open to a variety of 
nonmarital unions could be different than marriage, rather than inferior to it).  
324. Id. at 618.  
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only distributive injustice or only cultural harm will always yield inequitable 
results.   
The proposals advocated by the transformative plans are not without 
problems.  Transformative remedies are harder to pursue than affirmative 
remedies because, by their nature, the former are more revolutionary.  And 
there is always the valid question of what to do until transformative change 
arrives; some rightly argue that perhaps it is better to seek incremental (af-
firmative) change that protects some people than to work for structural 
change that may never come.  These well-known and valid questions are at 
the center of the debate regarding social and legal change, and there are many 
approaches to the dilemma.325  This Article does not offer an answer to this 
dilemma.  Rather, the Article crafts a general vision that could be useful even 
in considering small changes in the law; that is, revisions to specific laws—not 
only big revolutions—should follow the offered paradigm.326 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past two decades, while the marriage equality movement has 
gained significant traction, scholars criticized the movement for its over-focus 
on marriage.  One of the concerns that were voiced was that extending mar-
riage’s symbolism increases marriage’s shadow into all other relationships 
(that is, nonmartial unions are being evaluated and treated comparably to 
marriage).327  By that, the marriage equality movement entrenches the sym-
bolic power of marriage and the decreasing choices of marriage alternatives.  
This critique has often been dismissed as too vague and unrealistic.328  The 
harm that was proffered by marriage critics seemed too far in the future, too 
academic.  But the harm is present and clear.  Not only do we know already 
that in many places, as soon as same-sex marriage was legalized, civil unions 
were abolished.  But as this Article tells, the choice to live in nonmarital, undefined 
unions, is also diminishing.  The harm that can be caused by over-recognition 
is already tangible. 
  
325. See, e.g., MICHAEL T. HAYNES, THE LIMITS OF POLICY CHANGE: INCREMENTALISM, 
WORLDVIEW, AND THE RULE OF LAW 3–5 (2001) (arguing that incrementalism is the 
most realistic and preferred plan for legal and social change).  
326. For instance, to implement transformative policies, not only full reorganization of the whole 
system would work.  Rather, specific laws that rely on the function of the family for specific 
purposes—constitute important steps. 
327. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 236, 246–47 (2006). 
328. See, e.g., Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and 
the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 604–08 (1995). 
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LGBT organizations that applaud the financial aid rule somewhat 
blindly pursued their aims of cultural recognition without considering the 
economic distributional effects of their lobbying—especially the effect it has 
on other unmarried partners.  But it is not only unmarried opposite-sex couples 
who will be harmed by this new rule: In the same week this new policy unfolded 
concerning student financial aid, a study found that the overall poverty rate 
has increased within the LGBT community and that same-sex couples are 
more likely to be poor than opposite-sex couples.329 
The lesson from the financial aid saga should be learned by legal scholars 
who, with good intentions, seek more recognition of unmarried partners.  
Lawmakers, advocates, and scholars should consider the bottom line at the 
same time that they consider issues of recognition; they should choose their 
battles carefully and in a way that helps to mitigate rather than exacerbate sys-
temic problems.  Cultural and legal recognition are important, of course, but 
family law must ensure that the pursuit of these goals does not create or support 
policies that discriminate against unmarried partners. 
Similarly, functional family law is a good and important cause.  But ascrip-
tion is a double edged-sword; purely ascriptive recognition may be seen as a 
progressive policy that addresses the partners’ function as a family rather than 
their documented status; and that may be an accurate description. But ascrip-
tion can also become deprivative.  Progressive individuals should also be care-
ful not to mistake the agenda of valuing all families with that of over 
regulation of relationships. 
Thus, everyone’s goal should be equitable distribution of resources and 
benefits for all families, regardless of their status.  Promoting this platform is 
the best means of winning true, deeply rooted equality for unmarried partners. 
  
329. See M.V. LEE BADGETT, LAURA E. DURSO & ALYSSA SCHNEEBAUM, NEW PATTERNS 
OF POVERTY IN THE LESBIAN, GAY, AND BISEXUAL COMMUNITY (2013), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGB-Poverty-Update-Jun-2013.pdf. 
